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 Abstract 
Mandatory network unbundling is one of the foremost topics in regulatory economics 
today. The concept has crucial importance in the deregulation of many previously regulated 
industries including telecommunications, gas, electricity and railroads. Moreover, the topic has 
emerged as one of the more prominent issues associated with the implementation of the 1996 
Telecommunication Act in the United States. Upon initial examination, establishing the correct 
costing standards and/or determining the correct input prices would seem important for sending 
the correct price signals to the entrants for their efficient make-or-buy decisions. Sappington 
(AER, 2005) uses a standard Hotelling location model to show that input prices are irrelevant for 
an entrant’s make or buy decision. In this first essay, we show that this result is closely related to 
the degree of product differentiation when firms are engaged in price competition. Specifically, it 
is shown that input prices are irrelevant when firms produce homogeneous products, but are 
relevant for make-or-buy decisions when the entrant and incumbent produce differentiated 
products. These results suggest that, in general, it is important for regulators to set correct prices 
in order to not distort the entrants’ efficient make-or-buy decisions.  
The second essay investigates optimal access charges when the downstream markets are 
imperfectly competitive. Optimal access charges have been examined in the literature mainly 
under the condition where only the incumbent has market power. However, network industries 
tend to exhibit an oligopolistic market structure. Therefore, the optimal access charge under 
imperfect competition is an important consideration when regulators determine access charges. 
This essay investigates some general principles for setting optimal access charges when 
 
downstream markets are imperfectly competitive. One of the primary objectives of this essay is 
to show the importance of the break-even constraint when first-best access charges are not 
feasible. Specifically, we show that when the first-best access charges are not feasible, the 
imposition of the break-even constraint on only the upstream profit of the incumbent is superior 
to the case where break-even constraint applies to overall incumbent profit, where the latter is the 
most commonly used constraint in the access pricing literature. Bypass and its implications for 
optimal access charges and welfare are also explored. 
The third essay is empirical in nature and investigates two primary issues, both relating to 
unbundled network element (UNE) prices. First, as Crandall, Ingraham, and Singer (2004) 
suggested, we will empirically test the stepping stone hypothesis using a state-level data set that 
spans multiple years. To do this, we will explore the effect of UNE prices on facilities-based 
entry.  Second, in light of those findings, we will investigate whether the form of regulation (e.g. 
price cap and rate of return regulation) endogenously affects the regulator’s behavior with 
respect to competitive entry. Lehman and Weisman (2000) found evidence that regulators in 
price cap jurisdictions tend to set more liberal terms of entry in comparison with regulators in 
rate-of-return jurisdictions. This paper investigates whether their result is robust to various 
changes in modeling, including specification and econometric techniques.  
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CHAPTER 1 - Product Differentiation and the Irrelevancy of Input 
Prices for Make-or-Buy Decisions 
 
1.1 Introduction 
To introduce competition into the telecommunications industry, the 1996 
Telecommunications Act requires incumbent providers to unbundle their networks and lease 
individual network elements to any requesting telecommunications carrier.1 This concept is 
known as a mandatory unbundling policy and is prevalent in many network industries throughout 
the world. As a direct result of these unbundling policies, optimal access pricing for unbundled 
network elements has become a prominent issue in regulatory economics.2  The 1996 Act 
requires incumbent providers to supply unbundled network elements to rivals at cost-based 
prices. The pricing methodology implemented by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) was initially based on total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC).3 As Gayle and 
Weisman (2007a, p.196) stated, “following the passage of the 1996 Act, the FCC and the 
individual state public service commissions engaged in efforts to determine costing standards 
that provide entrants with the right price signals to make or buy the input required for 
downstream production.” The FCC has recently revisited this pricing methodology out of 
                                                 
1 47 U.S.C  251. 
2 See Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996) and Armstrong (2002) for a comprehensive analysis of access pricing.  
See Hausman and Sidak (1999) for the effects of unbundling policies on consumer welfare. See Crandall, Ingraham 
and Singer (2004) and Hazlett (2006) for the effect of mandatory network sharing on facilities-based investment. 
3 TELRIC costs are determined based on the cost structure of an “ideally-efficient” provider. See Weisman (2000) 
and Kahn, Tardiff and Weisman (1999) for comprehensive discussion of these issues. 
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concern that the TELRIC methodology may yield prices that serve to distort the entrant’s make-
or-buy decision.4  
Upon initial examination, establishing the correct costing standards and/or determining 
correct input prices would seem important for sending the correct price signals to entrants for 
their efficient make-or-buy decisions. This is not true in all cases, however. Sappington (2005), 
for example, uses a Hotelling location model for product differentiation to show that the 
entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision is independent of the price of the input.5 More 
specifically, Sappington’s model reveals that the market entrants’ decision for making or buying 
an input required for downstream production depends on a comparison between their cost and 
the incumbent’s cost of making the input, rather than evaluation between their cost and the input 
price at which the input can be purchased from the incumbent. Sappington’s conclusion is 
provocative since, if generally correct, it suggests that the efforts of the regulatory authorities to 
determine the correct prices for unbundled elements are largely pointless because input prices are 
irrelevant for efficient make-or-buy decisions. 
Following Sappington (2005), Gayle and Weisman (2007a) showed that, in the vertical 
Bertrand competition framework, input prices are not irrelevant and they concluded that “this 
line of research would benefit from a more general modeling framework as opposed to the rather 
specialized models that we employ in this paper and that Sappington employs in his article.”6,7 
The Hotelling framework for differentiated products is a horizontally differentiated approach, 
                                                 
4 See the FCC(2005, para 220).  The FCC continued this line of thinking when it removed mass market switching as 
an unbundled network element, in part, because TELRIC-based prices for switching discouraged investment in 
facilities-based networks. 
5 Sappington employs a Hotelling model with a simultaneous game structure in his analysis. One possible extension 
is to evaluate how Sappington’s conclusion changes when the game structure is changed from simultaneous to 
sequential. The results of the Hotelling location model with a sequential game structure are provided in Appendix B.  
6 See Gayle and Weisman (2007a, p. 201). 
7 Following Gayle and Weisman (2007a), Mandy (2009) showed that input prices are relevant except for make-or-
buy decisions except under restrictive assumptions on the demand structure in a more general setting.  
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whereas Gayle and Weisman (2007a) use a vertically differentiated approach in their analysis. In 
the vertically differentiated approach, the points in the characteristic space corresponding to the 
set of goods lie on the same ray vector through the origin representing higher quality farther out 
along this ray. Therefore, if these goods were sold at the same prices, every consumer would 
rank these goods in the same order. Conversely, in the horizontally differentiated models the 
goods cannot be ranked in terms of some quality index because preferences are diverse and 
asymmetric. Tastes follow some distribution across the characteristic space and each consumer 
determines her most preferred location. An alternative approach for product differentiation is to 
examine the case where preferences are defined over the set of all possible goods where a central 
feature is preference symmetry. This approach makes extensive use of representative consumer 
models.8 
Therefore, a natural question concerns whether contradictory results arise from 
inconsistencies in the definition of product differentiation. If this is the case, then a possible 
extension to address this inconsistency would enable us to produce more general rules for the 
relationship between the efficient make-or-buy decision and the irrelevancy of input prices.  
This is the central idea motivating this line of research. The remainder of this essay is 
organized as follows. The general assumptions and definitions are outlined in Section 1.2. The 
Hotelling location model is reviewed and the drawbacks of this model in terms of product 
differentiation are also examined. One possible extension is suggested in Section 1.3. It is shown 
that product differentiation in the standard Hotelling location model is problematic when two 
firms’ products are differentiated in only one characteristic. To compare the results provided in 
Section 1.3, the Bertrand price competition model, as a representative consumer model, for 
                                                 
8 See Beath and Katsoulacos (1991) for an extensive review of the literature on production differentiation. 
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homogeneous and differentiated products is employed and evaluated in a yardstick framework in 
Section 1.4.9 Section 1.5 summarizes the key findings and concludes. 
 
1.2 General Assumptions and Definitions 
An incumbent and an entrant are assumed to compete in a duopoly setting in the market 
for the downstream product. Each unit of downstream output requires one unit of the upstream 
input and one unit of the downstream input that is self-supplied by the individual firm. The 
entrant has an option to buy the upstream input from the incumbent at a price which is set by the 
regulator. Let  denote the wholesale price of the upstream input when the entrant purchases the 
upstream input from the incumbent. The constant unit cost of producing the upstream input for 
the incumbent and the entrant are denoted by and , respectively. In addition, and  
denote the constant unit cost of producing the downstream input for the incumbent and the 
entrant, respectively. 
w
I
uc
E
uc
I
dc
E
dc
 
1.3 The Hotelling model 
The assumptions and notation in this section are identical to Sappington (2005). 
Sappington employs a Hotelling location model of price competition for differentiated 
products.10 In this setting, the incumbent is located at point 0 and the entrant is located at point 1 
in product space. N consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit interval and each consumer 
buys one unit of the good and obtains utility v  which is assumed to be sufficiently large so that 
                                                 
9 It is not possible to use the vertical differentiation model as a complete yardstick model since the homogeneous 
product case cannot be examined using this framework. 
10 See Sappington (2005, pp.1632-1633). 
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each of N consumers purchases one unit of the retail product in equilibrium. Hence, demands are 
perfectly inelastic. A consumer at location [0, 1]L∈  incurs transportation cost (disutility)  if 
the consumer purchases the product from the incumbent and 
tL
)1( Lt −  if the consumer purchases 
the product from the entrant. Each consumer purchases the product from the firm that offers the 
smallest sum of retail price and transportation cost, or the lowest delivered price. Of primary 
interest in Sappington’s model is the level of  that induces the entrant to undertake the efficient 
make-or-buy decision. He concludes that the entrant undertakes the efficient make-or-buy 
decision if it purchases the upstream input from the incumbent whenever the incumbent is the 
least-cost supplier of the input , and produces the upstream input itself whenever it is 
the least-cost supplier of the input . This result is stated formally in Proposition 1.
w
)
);Eu
I
u ccif <
)( Eu
I
u cc <
( Eu cc <
., EM
E
B Π>Π
I
u
11 
 
Proposition 1 (Sappington): Regardless of the price  of the upstream input: (a) the 
entrant prefers to buy the upstream input from the incumbent when the incumbent is the least-
cost supplier of the input  and (b) the entrant prefers to make the 
upstream input itself when it is the least-cost supplier of the input  
)(w
.,.( ei
.( ei
I
u
E
u
E
B
E
M ccif <Π>Π ).
 
Proposition 1 reveals the somewhat surprising result that the entrant’s efficient make-or-
buy decision is independent of the established input price . This is the basis for Sappington’s 
principal finding that input prices are irrelevant for the entrant’s make-or-buy decision. 
)(w
The Hotelling location model is a widely used technique for modeling product 
differentiation as a form of spatial competition. In these models, product differentiation is 
                                                 
11 Proofs of all lemmas and propositions are provided in Appendix A. 
 5
captured by consumer’s preferences in purchasing some homogenous product from sellers at 
different locations when transportation costs exist.12  In this sense, Hotelling type models imply 
product differentiation if both duopolists locate at distinct points and no product differentiation if 
firms locate at the same point.13 On the other hand, the standard price and/or quantity duopoly 
models with negatively sloped demand curves–as a representative consumer model–require 
symmetric slopes of demand functions for homogeneous products and asymmetric slopes for 
differentiated products. The outstanding question therefore concerns the manner in which 
product differentiation in Hotelling models deviates from the representative consumer models. In 
other words, does fixing a firm’s location at distinct points on an interval imply a consistent 
product differentiation framework within the confines of representative consumer models?    
It is possible to show that Sappington’s location model can be reduced to a slightly 
modified version of homogeneous Bertrand competition under special conditions. Thus, the 
solutions support the well-known Bertrand Paradox under special conditions.14  
To see this, we use the Nash equilibrium prices and quantities obtained by Sappington 
(2005).15 When two firms have symmetric marginal costs ( i jc c c= = ), equilibrium prices, 
                                                 
12 Apart from transportation cost effect, there is no utility difference for consumers when they purchase the 
homogeneous product from either producer. 
13 See Beath and Katsoulacos (1991, p. 13). 
14 The Bertrand paradox reaches the conclusion that when two firms produce identical products, they price at 
marginal cost and they make zero profit if they have symmetric constant marginal costs. In the asymmetric marginal 
cost case, the firm with lower marginal cost makes positive profit while the higher marginal cost firm makes zero 
profit because the equilibrium price is equal to the higher value of marginal cost.  
15 The equilibrium prices, quantities and profits of Lemma 1 obtained by Sappington are as follows: 
( )1 [2 ] / 3;
(2) [3 ]/6
2
(3) [3 ] / 18
i i j
P t c c
ji iQ N t c c t
i j i
N t c c t
= + +
= + −
Π = + −
      where   u dc c c= +
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quantities and profits become , P t c= + 2Q N=  and 2NtΠ = . In words, both firms charge a 
price equal to constant marginal cost, and they share market demand equally.16   
Consider, for example, two online sellers that produce some homogeneous product. Each 
firm incurs a cost c per unit of production. Moreover, assume that there are N consumers who 
purchase one unit of the product. Assume also that when a firm sells a unit of the homogeneous 
product there is a constant shipping cost s as an expense for the consumer as in the Hotelling 
model. When the prices of the two firms differ, all consumers buy from the low-price producer. 
Conversely when the prices of the two firms are equal, both firms are assumed to share the 
market equally. It is straightforward to show that the unique Nash equilibrium prices, quantities 
and profits of this game are: , i jP P= = s c+ 2i jQ Q N= =  and 2i j NsΠ = Π = .  This slightly 
modified version of the Bertrand Paradox produces the same results as Sappington’s Hotelling 
model.  
Two observations with respect to this analysis are instructive. First, this version of the 
Bertrand Paradox deviates from the classical Bertrand Paradox in terms of equilibrium values. 
This is due to the fact that prices differ for customers and firms. Hence 2i j NsΠ = Π =  could be 
evaluated as a normal profit level if one compares two possible cases that depend on the entity 
responsible for the unit shipping cost. Second, in these two models it is appropriate to set s t= , 
since in the Hotelling framework the total transportation cost expenditures for purchasing the 
two firms’ product are the same if and only if the marginal consumer locates at the mid point of 
the [0,1] interval. Therefore, s and t can be used interchangeably for the specific cases of 
Hotelling and Bertrand competition models, respectively.  
                                                 
16 The constant symmetric marginal cost of a firm could be evaluated as two firms that face the same conditions for 
obtaining inputs.  
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An important observation is that the precise meaning of product differentiation in the 
Hotelling models diverges from the concept of product differentiation in standard price and 
competition models. In the Hotelling location models, fixing firms’ locations at different points 
automatically implies product differentiation. That is to say, the products are differentiated by 
location only; they are homogeneous in all other respects. As shown above, however, when firms 
have symmetric constant marginal costs, the model can be reduced to a simple homogeneous 
product standard price competition model.17 This is not particularly surprising when one 
considers the assumptions underlying the Hotelling model. By assuming uniformly distributed 
consumers on a unit interval and requiring each consumer to consume one unit of the product, 
we might be oversimplifying the concept of product differentiation because any asymmetric 
tastes of consumers are ignored. In other words, the standard Hotelling model is restrictive in 
representing product differentiation since the model’s assumptions do not allow consumers to 
pick their favorite location based on utility maximization. This is a drawback of the Hotelling 
type product differentiation models when the products of firms are differentiated in one 
dimension.    
When firms have asymmetric marginal costs, the Hotelling model can no longer be 
reduced to the homogeneous good case since the prices of both firms’ products differ under 
asymmetric marginal costs.18, 19  
                                                 
17 This is natural because the standard Hotelling location model typically begins with a statement like: “assume two 
producers of a homogeneous product locate at different points on an interval.” 
18 Asymmetric constant marginal cost may exist due to the result of different opportunities of obtaining inputs, the 
effects of learning curves, or different production technologies. 
19 Under another special condition on marginal costs we can see some other similarities between the two models. 
When firms have different marginal costs (ci ≠ cj), the equilibrium prices, quantities and profits are as given in 
footnote 13. If we assume that (ci cj) and that marginal costs are very disparate, then firm i may have an 
opportunity to capture every consumer (even the consumer that shares the location with the firm j.) This situation 
creates a discontinuity in profit functions and reaction curves. The problem is solved by assuming that the marginal 
costs of two firms are not too disparate in the Hotelling models. For detailed information see Beath and Katsoulacos 
<
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As we show above, under special conditions, namely symmetric constant marginal costs, 
the Hotelling setting yields a similar solution to the Bertrand paradox. This is the same case for 
homogeneous products in standard price competition models. Then the issue is whether we can 
eliminate this inconsistency in the models. As stated above, this contradiction occurs as a result 
of the first assumption of a homogeneous product in Hotelling type models. Then, assuming that 
the products of different firms are close but not perfect substitutes for consumers may serve to 
address this problem. In other words, we will allow the products of the firms to be differentiated 
in more than one characteristic.20 This modification also enhances the institutional realism of the 
model. 
Let us assume that each customer incurs total cost I IP tLψ +  if she buys the product from 
the incumbent and (1 )E EP t Lψ + −  if she buys from the entrant. For every consumer, assume 
that .I Eψ ψ< 21, 22 For simplicity, each consumer has the same value for Iψ  and .Eψ  One 
explanation for the given relation between Iψ  and Eψ is that of a loyalty effect.  For example, 
the incumbent’s product might be known and thus consumers tend to prefer the incumbent’s 
product if the price difference is not too large. Another reason would be high switching costs. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1991, p. 17-22). The analogous problem in homogeneous Bertrand competition models is known as the openness 
problem. For a discussion of the openness problem, see Tirole (1989, p. 234). 
20 See Economides (1986) for an analysis of Hotelling’s duopoly model when products are defined by two 
characteristics. 
21 Note that one approach for the assumption I Eψ ψ< would be to add a vertical differentiation dimension to the 
model. However, the suggested version is still different from the vertical differentiation approach since when prices 
of both products are the same all consumers would not buy the same good. In other words, even though the prices 
are the same, the consumers pick their lower cost product based on their respective locations. 
22 This assumption is reasonable given that switching costs and/or loyalty effects would tend to confer an advantage 
on the incumbent, ceteris paribus. 
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With positive switching costs, some consumers will accept a somewhat higher price for the 
incumbent’s product.23  
The settings wherein both the incumbent and entrant serve retail customers in equilibrium 
are the same as in Sappington (2005). To secure positive equilibrium quantities, we concentrate 
on interior solutions. Formally it is assumed throughout the analysis that: 
 
Assumption 1: ( ) ( ){ }max ( ) ( ) , 3I I E E I I I E E Ed d u d u dw c w c c c c c tψ ψ ψ ψ+ − + + − + < .  
 
Following Sappington, our interest is limited to upstream input prices that leave the 
incumbent with nonnegative profit in equilibrium when the entrant chooses to buy the upstream 
input from the incumbent at unit price .w 24 Formally, the assumption is given by: 
 
Assumption 2: ( ) ( ) 2( ) 3 18I E E E I I Iu B d dw c Q N t w c w c tψ ψ ψ⎡ ⎤− > − + + − +⎣ ⎦  
or equivalently: 
( )
( )
2
3 ( ) ( )1
3 3 ( ) ( )
I I I E
d dI
u I E E I I
d d
t w c w c
w c
t w c w c
ψ ψ
ψ ψ ψ
− + + +> − − + + + ⋅
                                                
 
 
Under these assumptions, equilibrium price (P), output level (Q), and profits (П) are 
characterized in Lemmas 1 and 2. The equilibrium values of the variables for the incumbent and 
 
23 See Klemperer (1987), Fournier (1998),  Lipman and Wang (2000),  Delgado-Ballester and Munuera-Aleman 
(2001) and Chaudhuri and Holbrook (2002) for detailed review of loyalty effects and switching costs. 
24 Following Sappington, very low values of input price are precluded since such an input price that is so low is 
impracticable for a meaningful make-or-buy decision. Hence, we exclude the case where w < cuE < cuI .    
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the entrant are denoted by the superscripts I and E, respectively. The subscripts M and B, denote 
equilibrium values of the “make” and “buy” cases, respectively. 
 
Lemma 1: If the entrant chooses to produce the upstream input itself, equilibrium retail 
prices, outputs, and profits are (for i j, ,I E,=  j i≠ ): 
( ) ( )3 2
;
3
i i i j j j
u d u di
M i
t c c c c
P
ψ ψ
ψ
+ + + +=                                                                             (1) 
( ) ( )3
;
6
i i i j j j
u d u di
M
t c c c c
Q N
t
ψ ψ− + + +=  and                                                                    (2) 
( ) ( ) 23
18
i i i j j j
u d u di
M i
t c c c c
N
t
ψ ψ
ψ
⎡ ⎤− + + +⎣Π = ⎦ ⋅                                                                      (3) 
 
Lemma 2: If the entrant chooses to buy the upstream input from the incumbent, 
equilibrium retail prices, outputs, and profits are (for , ,i j I E,=  j i≠ ): 
( ) ( )3 2
;
3
i i j j
di
B i
t w c w c
P
ψ ψ
ψ
+ + + += d                                                                                 (4) 
( ) ( )3
;
6
i i j j
di
B
t w c w c
Q N
t
ψ ψ− + + += d                                                                              (5) 
( ) ( ) 23
;
18
E E I I
dE
B E
t w c w c
N
t
ψ ψ
ψ
⎡ ⎤− + + +⎣Π = d ⎦ and                                                                (6) 
( ) ( ) 23
18
I I E E
dI I E
B u B I
t w c w c
w c Q N
t
ψ ψ
ψ
⎡ ⎤− + + +⎣⎡ ⎤Π = − + ⋅⎣ ⎦
d ⎦                                                 (7) 
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The entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision can be evaluated by using Lemma 1 and 
Lemma 2. The entrant prefers to buy the upstream input from the incumbent if , and  
prefers to make the input itself if . The entrant’s make-or-buy decision is summarized 
in Proposition 2. 
E
BΠ > ΠEM
E
M
E
BΠ < Π
 
Proposition 2: In the equilibrium of the Hotelling model for close substitutes: (a) the 
entrant prefers to buy the upstream input from the incumbent rather than make it if and only if 
( ) ( )( ;I E I Euw c w cψ ψ− > − )u  and (b) the entrant prefers to make the upstream input itself 
when ( ) ( )(I E Iu uw c w cψ ψ− < − )E
I
u
. 
 
Proposition 2, part (a) reveals that  is not a necessary condition for the entrant to 
buy the input from the incumbent. To see this, consider the case where the incumbent makes zero 
or negative profit from the upstream market, which implies that 
E
uc c>
I
uw c≤ . Then, the entrant’s buy 
decision condition holds if and only if . On the other hand, if the incumbent realizes 
positive profit from the upstream market ( ), then the case where  guarantees that 
E I
u uc c>
I
uw c> Iuc c= Eu
( ) ( )(I E Iuw c w cψ ψ− > − )Eu  will hold since ( ) 1E Iψ ψ > Iu. Nevertheless,  does not 
guarantee 
E
u c>c
( ) ( )( )uI E Iuw c w cψ ψ− > − E  when the incumbent makes a positive profit from the 
upstream market. Specifically, if both firms’ upstream input production costs are not too 
disparate when the input price is high, then the specified condition is less likely to hold, 
depending on the value for ( E I )ψ ψ . In other words, even when c , but with a sufficiently 
large w, the entrant prefers to make the upstream input because 
E
u > Iuc
( ) ( )( )Iu uw cψ ψ −I E− < Ew c . 
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This case also contradicts Sappington’s result for the efficient make-or-buy decision since it is 
possible for the entrant to have a higher upstream input production cost and yet still have the 
entrant prefer to make the upstream input rather than buy it from the incumbent provider. Hence, 
within the limits of the conditions specified here, the input price is not irrelevant for the entrant’s 
make-or-buy decision.   
Two observations regarding Proposition 2 are instructive. First, Proposition 2 is parallel 
to Proposition 2 of Gayle and Weisman (2007a) who employ a Bertrand vertical differentiated 
model to investigate whether input prices are irrelevant. However, when we assume firms’ 
products only differ in location and, except in the case where they produce identical products, 
then ( E I )ψ ψ  becomes 1, and Proposition 2 reduces to Proposition 1. Hence, the framework 
suggests that the irrelevancy of input prices depends on the degree of product differentiation. 
Specifically, within the Hotelling framework, if the entrant’s and incumbent’s products are 
identical, except for their differentiation along the location dimension, then input prices are 
irrelevant. In contrast, when both firms’ products differ in more than one characteristic the input 
prices become relevant. In other words, Sappington (2005) result is a special case of more 
general framework.  
 
1.4 Bertrand Price Competition 
In the previous section, we showed that Sappington’s (2005) main result concerning input 
price irrelevance is sensitive to the underlying assumptions regarding product differentiation. 
When the firms’ products are differentiated in more than one characteristic, input prices are no 
longer irrelevant. Since the vertical differentiation model cannot allow modeling the 
homogeneous product case, we require a somewhat different modeling framework to determine 
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the relevance of input prices for intermediate cases between homogeneous and differentiated 
products. We then apply the representative consumer approach to determine whether the 
irrelevance of input prices exhibits a similar pattern in the cases of homogeneous and 
differentiated products. In this respect, a simple Bertrand price competition model for 
homogeneous and differentiated product cases is employed to investigate efficient make-or-buy 
decisions. First a duopoly setting with homogeneous products is considered.  The analysis is then 
extended to the differentiated products case. 
1.4.1 Homogeneous Products Bertrand Competition 
We first note that Bertrand price competition for homogeneous products results in what 
has become known as the Bertrand Paradox. The Bertrand Paradox reaches the conclusion that 
under the assumption of two firms producing goods that are “non-differentiated” in that they are 
perfect substitutes in consumers’ utility functions, the two firms price at marginal cost and they 
do not make positive profits when firms have symmetric constant costs in equilibrium.25 In the 
asymmetric cost case, however, both firms set a price equal to the higher marginal cost and the 
firm with lower marginal cost makes a profit whereas the higher marginal cost firm realizes zero 
profit. However, the proof for the asymmetric marginal cost case is not as straightforward as the 
symmetric case. The asymmetric case gives rise to the “openness problem,” and cannot be solved 
unless some additional assumptions are made.26  
To keep the analysis simple, the downstream input cost for both firms is assumed to be 
zero. This assumption does not affect our model’s qualitative results and yet greatly reduces non-
                                                 
25 See Tirole (1989, p. 209-211). 
26 In the asymmetric cost case, the firm with lower marginal cost actually wants to set a price ε  below the high-cost 
firm’s marginal cost to secure the entire market. It wants to chooseε infinitesimally close to 0, but such an ε  does 
not exist. See Tirole (1989, p. 234). 
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substantive mathematical complexities. Similarly, in the Hotelling model, the incumbent is not 
allowed to have negative profit if the entrant prefers to buy the input from incumbent. Hence the 
case where  is excluded. Otherwise, the incumbent firm would incur negative profits and 
would therefore not be financially viable. 
Ic > w
Assume the incumbent and the entrant produce an identical product, and each firm incurs 
a marginal cost  where . The market demand function is given by ic ,i I E=
( )
1( , ) ( )
2
0 .
i i
i i j i i j
i j
D p if p p
D p p D p if p p
if p p
<⎧⎪⎪= =⎨⎪ >⎪⎩
j
 
The firms choose prices simultaneously. As stated above, the unique Nash equilibrium of 
this game is that both firms charge the price equal to the higher marginal cost. Therefore, the 
unique Nash price will be m  if each firm individually provides the input, and w if the 
entrant buys the input from the incumbent.  
ax{ , }I Ec c
 Under the specified assumptions, whenever the entrant buys the input from the 
incumbent, it earns zero profit since 1( ) ( )
2
E
B w w D w 0Π = − = . Hence the entrant’s profit is 
invariant to the buy decision. Notice that the incumbent’s viability condition plays a crucial role 
here.27 Related to this, there is an interesting feature of the specified game structure that should 
be noted. Under the specified conditions, if the entrant purchases the input from the incumbent, 
the openness problem may disappear since the incumbent may not need to undercut its price in 
order to secure the entire market. In other words, the incumbent may find that not undercutting 
                                                 
27 Since w cI whenever the entrant buys the input, both firms charge p≥ = w, so the entrant makes zero profit in 
equilibrium. 
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its price is more profitable in this case. Specifically, if the entrant purchases the input, the 
incumbent’s profit is 1( ) ( ) ( ) (
2 2
I I I
B w c D w w c D wΠ = − + − 1 )
)
 which is equivalent to 
. However, if the incumbent undercuts its price by ( ) (I IB w c D wΠ = − ε  to ensure that it secures 
the entire market, its profit will be ˆ ( ) (I IB w c D w )ε εΠ = − − −
I Ec c>
 which is lower than the previous 
profit if the demand function is sufficiently inelastic. The less elastic the demand function, the 
more likely the openness problem will disappear. Hence the incumbent will not have any 
incentive to secure the entire market under the specified conditions.  
Let us turn our attention to the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision. The following 
proposition asserts that in the homogeneous products case, the incumbent’s viability constraint 
binds and the entrant’s make-or-buy decision is independent of input prices. 
 
Proposition 3: In the equilibrium of the homogeneous products Bertrand game: (a) the 
entrant prefers to make the input if and only if   and (b) otherwise the entrant is 
indifferent between buying and making the input. 
 
Proposition 3 reveals that the entrant’s make-or-buy decision is irrelevant to the input 
price. The entrant makes the input whenever it is the least-cost supplier of the input. However, 
when it is not the least-cost supplier the entrant is indifferent to either case. To see the 
irrelevancy of the input price for part (b), consider the following two cases: (i)  and 
(ii) .  First, in the case where  if the entrant makes the input both firms 
will charge price 
E Ic w c> ≥
E Iw c c> ≥ ,Ec w c> ≥ I
Ep c= , and the entrant makes zero profit while the incumbent makes positive 
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profit, 1( ) (
2
I E I
M c c D cΠ = − )E I. Conversely, in the case where  if the entrant makes 
the input, then the market price 
,Ec w c> ≥
Ep c= , the firms’ profits are 1( ) ( )
2
0E ED cE EM c cΠ = − =  and  
1( ) (
2
I E I
M c c D cΠ = − )E I. Hence, in the case where , the entrant is indifferent to the make-
or-buy decision. Comparing the cases ( ) and ( ) reveals that the entrant’s 
equilibrium profit is not affected. In words, whether the entrant’s marginal cost exceeds the input 
price that is set by the regulator or not, the entrant realizes zero profit in equilibrium. Observe 
that the viability condition of the incumbent plays a crucial role for the irrelevancy of input 
prices in the homogeneous products Bertrand framework. However this assumption plays the 
same role as the financial viability assumption in the standard Hotelling model.  
Ec c≥
wEc ≥ Ec>w
1.4.2 Differentiated Products Bertrand Competition 
As shown in the previous sub-section, input prices are irrelevant in the homogeneous 
products Bertrand framework. The next logical question concerns whether this property of input 
prices is sensitive to the degree of product differentiation. As discussed in the introduction, there 
are three commonly used methods to model product differentiation. The representative consumer 
based product differentiation models are the most commonly used models in the literature. The 
following simple Bertrand competition model is one of these types of product differentiation 
models. Gayle and Weisman (2007b) examine the entrant's make-or-buy decision in the two-
stage game framework. In the first stage, the incumbent chooses investment in innovation and 
competes against an entrant in the second stage. Although their model is similar to ours, they do 
not examine the irrelevance of input prices.  
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Let inverse market demand functions be given by i ii iP Q
jQα β γ= − −  where ,i I E=  
and .i ≠ j 28 Note that the cross-price effects are symmetric as required for well-behaved 
consumer demand functions. Using this inverse demand system, the direct demand system can be 
expressed as:  and Q a  Note that the relation between the 
parameters in the two systems can be expressed as 
I I
I IQ a b P dP= − + E E IE dP b= + −
a
.EE P
( ) /i i j jα β α γ δ= − , ib jβ δ= for i j≠ , 
 and , Ei I= d γ δ=  where 2.I Eδ β β= −γ   
Equilibrium price (P), output level (Q), and profits (П) of the entrant are characterized in 
Lemmas 3 and 4. The equilibrium values of the variables for the entrant are denoted by the 
superscript E, and the subscript M and B are used to denote the equilibrium values of the make-
and-buy cases, respectively.  
 
Lemma 3: If the entrant chooses to produce the upstream input itself, its equilibrium 
retail prices, outputs, and profits are given, respectively, by: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )2
2 2
;
4
E E I I
E I I I E u d I u dE
M
I E
a b a d b b c c b d c c
P
b b d
+ + + + += −                                                      (8) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
2
2
2 2
;
4
E E I I
E I I I E u d I u dE
M E
I E
a b a d b b d c c b d c c
Q b
b b d
+ − − + + += −  and                               (9) 
                                                 
)
28 These linear inverse demand functions are obtained from Singh and Vives (1984). Singh and Vives model an 
economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, each one producing a differentiated good, and a competitive 
numeraire sector. In their linear model, there is a continuum of consumers of the same type with a utility function 
separable and linear in the numeraire good, implying there are no income effects on the monopolistic sector. The 
representative consumer maximizes  The utility of the consumer is assumed to be quadratic and 
strictly concave 
2
1( , ) .1 2 ii iU q q p q=− ∑
( 21 1 1 2 2 221 2 1 1 2 2( , ) 2 2U q q q q q q q qα α β γ β= + − + + , where iα  and  iβ  are positive, , , and 
for , . Hence, this utility function yields a linear demand structure with inverse demands 
given by 
1, 2i = 2 0i jβ β γ− >
0i j jα β α γ− >
i
i j≠ 1, 2i =
i i i jP q qα β γ= − − . 
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( ) ( )( ) (
( )
) 22
2
2 2
4
E E I I
E I I I E u d I u dE
M E
I E
a b a d b b d c c b d c c
b
b b d
⎡ ⎤+ − − + + +⎢ ⎥Π = ⋅−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                               (10) 
 
Lemma 4: If the entrant chooses to buy the upstream input from the incumbent, its 
equilibrium retail prices, outputs, and profits are given respectively by:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
2
2 2
;
4
E I I
E I I I E d I u d dE
B
I E
a b a d b b w c b d d c c d w c
P
b b d
+ + + + − + + += −
I
                      (11) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 2
2
2 2
;
4
E I I
E I I I E d I u d dE
B E
I E
a b a d b b d w c b d d c c d w c
Q b
b b d
+ − − + + − + + += −
I
 and          (12) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
22 2
2
2 2
.
4
E I I
E I I I E d I u d dE
B E
I E
a b a d b b d w c b d d c c d w c
b
b b d
⎡ ⎤+ − − + + − + + +⎢ ⎥Π = −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
I
           (13) 
 
The following proposition asserts that in the differentiated product case, the entrant’s 
make-or-buy decision is not independent of the level of the input prices. 
 
Proposition 4: In the equilibrium of the differentiated products Bertrand model: (a) the 
entrant prefers to buy the upstream input from the incumbent rather than make it if and only if 
( ) (222 ;I I Eu b b dw c w cd⎛ ⎞−− > −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ )Eu  and (b) the entrant prefers to make the upstream input itself 
when ( ) ( )222I EI Eu ub b dw c w cd⎛ ⎞−− < −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
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Proposition 4, part (a) reveals that  is a not a necessary condition for the entrant to 
buy the input from the incumbent. When the incumbent makes zero or negative profit from the 
upstream market, thereby implying that 
E
uc c>
I
uw c
I
u
≤ , the entrant’s buy decision condition holds if and 
only if . However, when the incumbent earns positive profit from the upstream market 
( ), if the firms have symmetric upstream marginal costs (
E
uc c>
c
I
u
E
u
I
uw > Iuc c= ), the specified inequality 
in the Proposition 4, part (a) holds since
2
2
2 I Eb b d
d
− 1>
⎝ ⎠
I
u
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ .  
However, the case where the incumbent is the least-cost supplier ( ) is ambiguous. 
In this case, the entrant may or may not buy the upstream input. Specifically, as the firms 
upstream production costs converge to one another and when 
E
uc c>
2⎛ ⎞⎟⎝ ⎠2
2 I Eb b d
d
−⎜
I
u
 is sufficiently close 
to 1, the entrant is less likely to buy the upstream input. In other words, when , the 
entrant would prefer to make the input for a sufficiently large input price w, implying that 
E
uc c>
( ) (222I I Eu b b dw c w cd⎛ ⎞−− < −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ )Eu  is a possibility in this case. This case also underscores the 
relevancy of input prices because it is possible for the entrant to have a higher upstream input 
production cost and still prefer to make the upstream input instead of buying it from the 
incumbent. Hence, within the limits of the model specified here, the input price is not irrelevant 
for the entrant’s make-or-buy decision.   
Note that Proposition 4 is a slightly different version of Proposition 2. Both propositions 
have similar qualitative results. However, the conditions of Proposition 4 moves toward the 
homogeneous products case when 
2
2
2 I Eb b d
d
⎛ −⎜⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟  approaches 1 since 
2
2
2 I Eb b d
d
⎛ −⎜⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟  measures the 
 20
degree of product differentiation. When 
2
2
2 I Eb b d
d
⎛ −⎜⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟  equals 1, this implies that , and 
the demand system may not be well-defined. However, it is possible to say that as 
I Eb b d= =
2
2
2 I Eb b
d
− d⎛ ⎞
⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟
 
approaches 1 in the limit, the products of the firms become more homogeneous and the greater 
the degree of homogeneity, the less relevant are input prices in equilibrium. Hence, this 
framework suggests that the irrelevancy of input prices depends on the degree of product 
differentiation. Specifically, in similar fashion to the Hotelling framework, within the Bertrand 
competition setting, if the entrant’s and incumbent’s products are homogeneous, then the input 
prices are irrelevant. Conversely when both firms’ products are differentiated, the input prices 
become relevant.  
 
1.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The primary objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between product 
differentiation and the irrelevance of input prices for the entrants’ make-or-buy decisions. We 
find that Sappington’s main result on the irrelevance of input prices is sensitive to the particular 
level of product differentiation in the Hotelling model. Specifically, Sappington’s results 
concerning the irrelevance of input prices depend on the limitations of the standard Hotelling 
location model for product differentiation. It is shown that even under the Hotelling framework, 
allowing for product differentiation in more than one characteristic undermines Sappington’s 
main result concerning the irrelevance of input prices for make-or-buy decisions. Allowing 
product differentiation in more than one characteristic produces results similar to those of Gayle 
and Weisman (2007a). The representative consumer approach also provides similar qualitative 
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results. Our findings serve to establish that input prices for make-or-buy decisions are irrelevant 
if the incumbent and the entrant produce identical products, and relevant if the firms produce 
differentiated products. The policy implications of these results are important. Unless the 
incumbent’s and entrant’s products are perfectly homogeneous, regulatory agencies should seek 
to set efficient prices to minimize efficiency distortions. 
The models employed in this study treat product differentiation as independent from the 
actions of firms since the product differentiation definition relies on consumer preferences.  
However, in reality firms exert significant effort and go to great expense to differentiate their 
products from those of their rivals. Thus, employing models where the degree of product 
differentiation is endogenous to the firms may be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
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Appendix A - Proofs for Lemmas and Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
See Sappington (2005, pp. 1632-1633). 
 
Proof of Lemma 1:  
The location of the consumer that is indifferent between purchasing from the incumbent 
and the entrant satisfies the following equation: 
(1 )I I E EM MP tL P t Lψ ψ+ = + −                                                                                           (A1) 
Solving (A1) for L yields: 
ˆ
2
I I E E
M Mt P PL
t
ψ ψ− += ; and                                                                                             (A2) 
ˆ1
2
E E I I
Mt P PL
t
ψ ψ− +− = M ⋅                                                                                                (A3) 
The profits of the incumbent and the entrant are given, respectively, by 
( ) ;2
I I E E
I I I I M
M M u d
t P PP c c N
t
ψ ψ− +Π = − − M  and                                                              (A4) 
( ) 2
E E I I
E E E E M
M M u d
t P PP c c N
t
ψ ψ− +Π = − − ⋅M                                                                     (A5) 
Maximizing (A4) and (A5) with respect to IMP and
E
MP , respectively, then solving the first 
order conditions simultaneously yields                                         
( ) ( )3 2
3
I I I E E E
u d u dI
M I
t c c c c
P
ψ ψ
ψ
+ + + += ; and                                                                  (A6)  
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( ) ( )3 2
3
E E E I I I
u d u dE
M E
t c c c c
P
ψ ψ
ψ
+ + + += ⋅                                                                          (A7) 
Substituting (A6) and (A7) into (A2) and (A3), respectively, then multiplying the 
resulting equations by N yields: 
( ) ( )3
6
I I I E E E
u d u dI
M
t c c c c
Q N
t
ψ ψ− + + += ; and                                                                (A8)  
( ) ( )3
6
E E E I I I
u d u dE
M
t c c c c
Q N
t
ψ ψ− + + += ⋅                                                                       (A9)  
Substituting (A6) and (A8) into (A4), and (A7) and (A9) into (A5) yields: 
( ) ( ) 23
;
18
I I I E E E
u d u dI
M I
t c c c c
N
t
ψ ψ
ψ
⎡ ⎤− + + +⎣Π = ⎦  and                                                        (A10)  
( ) ( ) 23
18
E E E I I I
u d u dE
M E
t c c c c
N
t
ψ ψ
ψ
⎡ ⎤− + + +⎣Π = ⎦ ⋅                                                               (A11)  
 
Proof of Lemma 2:  
The proof follows steps similar to those of Lemma 1. The difference arises from the 
definition of profits.  For the buy decision, the incumbent makes profits from the production of 
the upstream input which is basically a function of the entrant’s quantity and its downstream 
production. On the other hand, when the entrant buys the upstream input, w replaces  as the 
entrant’s upstream marginal cost. Therefore, if the entrant buys the upstream input from the 
incumbent, the incumbent’s profits are:                                           
E
uc
( ) ;2
I I E E
I I E I I I B
B u B B u d
t P Pw c Q P c c N
t
ψ ψ− +⎡ ⎤Π = − + − −⎣ ⎦ B  and                                        (A12) 
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( ) 2
E E I I
E E E B
B B d
t P PP w c N
t
ψ ψ− +Π = − − ⋅B
)
                                                                     (A13) 
Maximizing (A12) and (A13) with respect to  and , respectively, then solving the 
first-order conditions simultaneously yields:                                       
I
BP
E
BP
( ) (3 2
;
3
I I E E
dI
B I
t w c w c
P
ψ ψ
ψ
+ + + += d
)
 and                                                                   (A14)  
( ) (3 2
3
E E I I
d dE
B E
t w c w c
P
ψ ψ
ψ
+ + + += ⋅                                                                          (A15) 
Substituting (A14) and (A15) into (A2) and (A3), respectively, then multiplying the 
resulting equations by N yields: 
( ) ( )3 I Id dt w cψ− + +
6
E E
I
B
w c
Q N
t
ψ += ; and                                                                (A16) 
( ) ( )3
6
E E I I
d dE
B
t w c w c
Q N
t
ψ ψ− + + += ⋅                                                                        (A17)  
Substituting (A14) and (A16) into equation
(A13) y
 (A12) and (A15) and (A17) into equation 
ields:  
( ) ( ) ( )
2
3
;
18
I I E E
d dI I E
B u B I
t w c w c
w c Q N
t
ψ ψ
ψ
⎡ ⎤− + + +⎣ ⎦Π = − +  and                                    (A18)                      
( ) ( ) 23
18
E E I I
d dE
B E
t w c w c
N
t
ψ ψ
ψ
⎡ ⎤− + + +⎣ ⎦Π = ⋅                                                                  (A19)                       
 
roof of Proposition 2: 
and (A19) reveals that the condition for the entrant’s efficient 
make-or-buy decision,  
P
A comparison of (A11) 
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E E
M BΠ = Π
<
>
                                                                                                                       (A20) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2E E E I I I E E I I3 3u d u d d dt c c c c t w c w cψ ψ ψ ψ
<
⎡ ⎤ ⎡⇔ − + + + = − + + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣
>
⎤⎦                (A21)  
)I .                                                                                    (A22)  
Hence, the entrant buys the up
( ) (E E Iu uw c w cψ ψ
<
⇔ − = −
>
stream input from the incumbent when E EB MΠ > Π , or  
( ) ( ).EI Eu uIw c w cψψ− > −                                                                                                 (A23) 
The entrant prefers to make the upstream input when ,E EB MΠ < Π  which implies that 
( ) ( ).EI Eu uIψw c w cψ− < −                                                                                                 (A24) 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  
he proof is straightforward. As stated in the body of the essay, for w I, the entrant 
earns z buy the input. In the case where the e t makes the 
input, 
T ≥ c
ntran
s
ero profit if it chooses to I Ec c>  
and both firms charge a price of p=cI, and the entrant’  profits are 
1( ) ( ) 0.E I E Ic c D cΠ = − >  Hence, the entrant prefers to make the input if it is the least-cost 
E I
input both firms will charge price p=cE, and the entra es zero profit while the incumbent 
2M
supplier. This establishes part (a). In the case where t is in rent to either 
option. To show this in the case where c , obs if the entrant chooses to make the 
nt mak
E Ic c≥  
erve that 
the entran diffe
≥ c
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makes positive profit of 1( ) ( )I E I Ec c D cΠ = − . However, if the entrant buys the input, then the 
market price is p=w, the entran nce again zero and the incumbent’s profit is 
( ) ( )B II w c D wΠ = − . Hence the entrant is indifferent to the make-or-buy decision. This 
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A28) into the demand system provides: 
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Substituting (A27) and (A29) into (A25) and (A28), and (A30) into (A26) yields:  
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The proof follows ste
e definition of profits.  For the buy decision the incumbent makes profits from both the 
production of the upstream input which is basically a function of the entrant’s quantity and its 
downstream production. However, when the entrant buys the upstream input, w replaces Euc  as 
the entrant’s upstream marginal cost. Hence, if the entrant buys the upstream input from the 
incumbent, the profits are:                                           
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Substituting (A35) and (A36) into the demand system yields: 
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Substituting (A35), (A37) and (A38) into (A33), and (A36) and (A38) into (A34) yields:  
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Proof of Proposition 4: 
A comparison of (A32) and (A40) reveals that the condition for the entrant’s efficient 
make-or-buy decision.   
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Hence, the entrant buys the upstream input from the incumbent when  which 
implies that 
,E EB MΠ > Π
              ( ) ( ) (222 I EIu b b dw c w cd
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E
M
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The entrant prefers to make the upstream input when EBΠ < Π  which implies that 
              ( ) ( ) (222 I EIu b b dw c w cd
−− < − )Eu .                                                                               (A46) 
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Appendix B - The Irrelevancy of Input Prices in a Sequential Game 
Sappington (2005) employs the Hotelling model to demonstrate the irrelevance of input 
prices in a simultaneous game framework. One possible extension would be to examine the 
concept in a sequential game framework. In the sequential framework, we assume that the 
incumbent firm is the leader and the entrant is the follower. The remaining assumptions are 
identical to those in Sappington (2005).  
We will present the entrant’s equilibrium values only. When the entrant makes the 
upstream input, the entrant’s equilibrium price, output, and profit are given by: 
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Conversely, when the entrant chooses to buy the upstream input from the incumbent, the 
entrant’s equilibrium price, output, and profit are given by: 
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A comparison of (B3) and (B6) reveals the conditions for the entrant’s efficient make-or-
buy decision. Specifically, the entrant prefers to make the upstream input itself if  E EM BΠ > Π  and 
buy the input from the incumbent if E EM BΠ < Π . Therefore the entrant makes the upstream input 
when , and the entrant prefers to buy the upstream input from the incumbent if and only 
if  Hence, in comparison with the simultaneous game framework, the sequential game 
structure affects only the equilibrium values, but not the irrelevance of the input prices. Hence, 
Sappington’s result on input irrelevance is robust to the change from a simultaneous-move to a 
sequential-game framework. 
I
uc c>
.I Eu uc<
E
u
c
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CHAPTER 2 - Access Pricing Under Imperfect Competition 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Industries such as telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, railroads, water, and the 
postal service all have both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive segments. Hence, 
these industries can be viewed as having a vertical integrated structure. In the 
telecommunications industry, local loops can be regarded as the naturally monopolistic segment, 
whereas long distance and the value-added services can be regarded as potentially competitive. 
In the electric power industry, transmission and distribution are naturally monopolistic segments, 
while electricity generation is potentially a competitive segment. Similarly, in the natural gas 
industry, pipelines are the naturally monopolistic segment whereas extraction can be classified as 
a potentially competitive segment. In the railroad industry, tracks and stations are in the naturally 
monopolistic segment while passenger and freight services are potentially in the competitive 
segment. All of these industries are similar in the sense that they contain both potentially 
competitive segments and natural monopolistic segments.  
Naturally monopolistic segments of these industries are often referred to as bottleneck 
segments. Therefore, effective potential competition requires the non-discriminatory access to 
bottleneck segments. Without question, unbundling and/or access pricing is the main policy 
instrument for introducing competition in these industries. In other words, access pricing is a 
critical policy for deregulation of industries where a vertically integrated dominant firm controls 
the supply of a bottleneck input.  
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Access pricing is not a new issue in regulatory economics. Its roots derive from the 
essential facilities doctrine that dates back to a U.S. Supreme Court decision for railroads in the 
early 20th century. In 1912 the Supreme Court forced the Terminal Railroad Association to allow 
its competitors to use its terminal facilities.29,30 As Sherman (2008, p. 266) observed following 
the Supreme Court decision, when a firm has monopolistic power over a facility that is required 
by other firms in order to compete, it has been argued that other suppliers should have access to 
the facility on non-discriminatory terms and conditions. 31  
Access pricing became the main policy instrument for regulators after vertically 
integrated monopolies were deregulated. Increased criticism of regulation in the 1970s and 1980s 
led to network unbundling with the goal of increased competition. For example, in Britain before 
privatizing the national railway in 1994, the railways were sold to approximately seventy 
companies and the most important company, Railtrack, owned and maintained the 
infrastructure.32  
In the United States, the most recent example of unbundling as an industrial policy is the 
1996 Telecommunications Act.33 Section 251(d)(2) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act directs 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to determine the specific network elements that 
incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) must provide to their competitors on an unbundled 
                                                 
29 See United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) and 236 U.S. 194 (1915). 
30 The Terminal Railroad Association was an organization of railroads that owned a railroad bridge and other 
facilities in St. Louis, Missouri. 
31 See Lipsky and Sidak (1999) and Robinson and Weisman (2008) for detailed review of the essential facilities 
doctrine. 
32 For more detailed discussion, see Gómez-Ibáñez J. A. (2003, p. 247, 264-297). 
33 The 1996 Telecommunication Act Section 251 (d)(2): In determining what network elements should be made 
available for purposes of subsection (c) (3), the Commission shall consider, at a minimum, whether— 
(A)  access to such network  elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary; and 
(B) the failure to provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications 
carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer. 
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basis at “cost-based” rates.34 Nevertheless, the ILECs and the competitive local exchange 
carriers’ (CLECs) are at odds with respect to the pricing of unbundled network elements (UNEs) 
at cost-based rates. The ILECs contend that economic efficiency requires that prices for UNEs be 
based on the actual, forward-looking costs. Conversely the CLECs contends that economic 
efficiency demands that prices for UNEs be based on the forward-looking costs of an ideally 
efficient ILEC as this standard is consistent with the competitive market structure that the 1996 
Telecommunications Act envisioned.35  
Both approaches can be criticized on various grounds. First, ILECs may have incentives 
to misreport their actual costs. Whether the inefficiencies of ILECs should be reflected in UNE 
prices is another point of criticism. Moreover, the ILEC might not have proper incentives to 
achieve efficiency if UNE prices are based on actual costs. On the other hand, the definition for 
the ideally efficient ILEC is unclear, and the proper standard to determine what constitutes “an 
ideally efficient” ILEC is a difficult question to answer. Moreover as Weisman (2000, p. 196) 
observed “If regulators had sufficient information to implement the efficient–firm cost standard, 
competition would be wholly unnecessary.” 
Therefore, the complex issue of optimal access charges lies at the core of deregulation 
efforts in network industries. In other words, a sound access pricing policy is crucial for the 
efficient development of competition in industries with bottleneck inputs. Moreover, Laffont and 
Tirole (2001, p. 98-99) observed that an optimal access charge policy must serve numerous 
purposes. It must generate efficient use of networks, encourage incumbents to invest, promote 
                                                 
34 See Kahn,Tardiff and Weisman (1999) for a comprehensive discussion of the economics underlying the 1996 
Telecommunications Act.  
35 See Weisman (2002) and Weisman (2000).  
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cost minimization, and create an efficient amount of entry into infrastructure, and do all this at a 
reasonable regulatory cost.  
Realizing all of these objectives simultaneously with a single policy instrument is 
complex. High access prices not only prevent society from reaching a desired level of 
competition by raising barriers to entry and perhaps allowing the incumbents to sustain their 
monopoly power in the potentially competitive segments of the industry, but also lead potential 
competitors to engage in socially inefficient bypass and/or duplication of facilities. Conversely, 
low access prices might create socially inefficient entry and discourage competitors from 
investing in their own facilities. Low access prices may also discourage the incumbents from 
maintaining and upgrading their facilities. As Laffont and Tirole (2001, p. 99) point out, the 
access price is critical in order to give incumbents the correct signals for their choices of 
investment in infrastructure and induce potential competitors to enter into socially desirable 
segments.  
Optimal access pricing has become one of the central topics in modern regulatory 
economics. In the access pricing literature, there is a distinction between one-way access pricing 
and two-way access pricing. In one-way access, pricing only competitors require vital inputs 
from the monopolistic incumbent. In the case of two-way access pricing, all firms in the market 
need to purchase critical inputs from each other. In this study we focus on one-way access 
pricing.36 
The purpose of this study is to examine optimal access charges under an oligopolistic 
market structure. Although formerly regulated industries post-deregulation exhibit properties that 
are closer to an oligopolistic market structure, most of the optimal access pricing literature 
                                                 
36 See Chapter 5 in  Laffont and Tirole (2001), Armstong (2002, p. 350-379), and Chapters 5 and 6 in Dewenter and 
Haucap (2007) for studies that examine two-way access pricing. 
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focuses on contestable/perfect competition models. In this respect, we study key characteristics 
of optimal access charges in a simple Cournot competition model where only one input is 
necessary for the downstream production. This is a simple framework and many complicated 
real-word issues such as asymmetric information, investment decisions, and dynamics are 
suppressed. Nonetheless, this analysis provides a useful starting point for the analysis and future 
research. 
As Vickers (1995) observed, Cournot competition results in market outputs with positive 
markups. Hence, a vertically integrated firm has a markup over the marginal cost of the input 
while a competitor will have a markup over the price of the critical (essential) input. These are 
downstream markups. On the other hand, if the access price exceeds marginal cost then there 
would be a second markup from the upstream market. Hence, determining the optimal access 
charge requires regulators to address these two markups within the Cournot framework.  
Optimal access charges are closely related to the concepts of the first-best and the 
second-best efficiency. When the non-negativity profit constraint of the vertically integrated 
incumbent is not taken into account, optimal access prices are the first-best access prices. 
However, first-best access pricing may result in negative profit for the vertically integrated 
incumbent threatening its financial viability. This is the case when the incumbent’s break-even 
constraint is binding at the social optimum. Therefore, the effects of the profit constraint must be 
explicitly taken into account. Taking into account the profit constraint of the incumbent gives 
rise to the concept of second-best access pricing.  
The non-negativity profit constraint of the incumbent is extensively used in the access 
pricing literature. The general approach is to examine a non-negativity constraint that applies to 
the overall profit of the incumbent. However, this potentially distorts competition in the 
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downstream market since applying a non-negativity profit constraint to the overall profit of the 
incumbent guarantees normal profit for the incumbent in both the regulated upstream market and 
the competitive downstream market. This might tend to create a bias that favors the incumbent’s 
downstream production. Guaranteeing a normal profit for the incumbent provider leads to a 
distortion in the retail market by suppressing at least some of the advantages expected of 
competition. Moreover, it might be the case that the incumbent’s inefficiencies are passed on to 
the retail market. In the competitive/contestable market framework with retail price regulation, 
guaranteeing non-negative overall profit may not create a serious distortion compared with the 
first-best output. However, in an oligopolistic market structure the non-negativity assumption 
leads to a potentially large deviation from first-best output levels. 
One solution for the given problem would be to impose a non-negativity constraint to the 
incumbent’s upstream profit only while deregulating the downstream segment of the industry. 
One of the objectives of this paper is to compare the welfare effects of these two policies. To that 
end, we evaluate the welfare properties within the Cournot model and show that imposing the 
non-negativity constraint on only upstream profits provides higher total welfare than imposing 
the non-negativity constraint on overall profits.  
Our simple framework is also used to examine the effect of bypass. Bypass arises when 
the competitor–rather than using the incumbent’s network–uses an alternative source for the 
bottleneck input. We show that under certain conditions bypass can be welfare-enhancing. 
The organization of the remainder of this essay is as follows. Section 2.2 provides a 
literature review. Although there is a voluminous literature on the topic, the focus here is 
primarily on studies that explore optimal access charges. Section 2.3 discusses the main elements 
of the model. The first–best and second–best access prices in an oligopolistic market structure 
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are derived in Section 2.4. This section also includes the welfare comparisons of two possible 
policies regarding the non-negativity constraint of the vertically integrated provider. In Section 
2.5, the possibility of bypass and its effects on optimal access charges are examined. Section 2.6 
contains the conclusion. The proofs for all lemmas and propositions are contained in Appendix 
C. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Since network unbundling has developed into a key policy instrument for introducing 
competition into previously regulated industries, the topic has attracted significant interest from 
researchers. As a result, a voluminous access pricing literature has emerged. However, since our 
objective is to investigate general principles for optimal access charges under an oligopolistic 
market structure, we limit the discussion to studies that focus on properties of optimal access 
charges. 
Perhaps one of the most important results in the optimal access charge literature is known 
as the Baumol-Willig efficient component pricing rule (ECPR). Willig (1979) and Baumol 
(1983) advocate the ECPR.37 Their analyses depend on contestable markets which can be treated 
as part of a perfect competition framework. The optimal access price of a bottleneck input based 
on the ECPR should be equal to the direct incremental cost of access plus the opportunity cost 
borne by the integrated access provider in supplying access. The opportunity cost is the decrease 
in the incumbent’s profit caused by the provision of the bottleneck input to a rival. Therefore, the 
access charge can be higher than the direct incremental cost by a substantial margin. The ILECs 
                                                 
37 See also Chapter 7 in Baumol and Sidak (1994). 
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generally favor such an access pricing policy. However, the fact that previously regulated 
industries are far from being competitive is a serious point of criticism. Moreover, the inclusion 
of the opportunity cost term in this form of access pricing means that less-efficient incumbents 
will receive higher prices for their input, ceteris paribus. 
Spencer and Brander (1983) focus on departures from marginal cost pricing induced by 
imperfect competition in industries that require publicly-produced inputs. As they assumed the 
public enterprise has a vertically-integrated structure, their analysis is conducted with and 
without the non-negative profit constraint imposed on the public enterprise. They show that in 
order to induce the socially desirable output under imperfect competition, the first best access 
charge requires an input price set below the marginal cost of the input. However, when the profit 
constraint is introduced, the second-best input price exceeds the marginal cost of the input.  
Laffont and Tirole (1994) investigate optimal access prices in a competitive fringe model 
using a principal-agent framework. In their analysis, the key assumption is that the regulator can 
make up any possible earnings deficiency for the incumbent using public funds. However, they 
also examine optimal access pricing in the absence of government transfers. The authors show 
that the first-best access pricing should be marginal cost pricing. However, when marginal cost 
pricing results in an earnings shortfall for the incumbent provider, competitors should contribute 
to the fixed cost of the network. The authors state that the contribution takes the form of an 
access charge exceeding the marginal cost of the input. With this contribution, it is possible to 
reduce public funds and/or the price distortions related to the incumbent’s budget constraint. It is 
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noteworthy that their results also suggest that when taxation of the competitive downstream 
products is feasible, the access price can be equal to marginal cost.38 
Vickers (1995) examines a vertically integrated industry structure with naturally 
monopolistic and competitive segments. He examines whether the upstream monopolist should 
be allowed to operate in the deregulated competitive sector. Vickers employs a Cournot model in 
an asymmetric-information environment, and compares total welfare under linear and unit-elastic 
demand functions in the cases of vertical integration and vertical separation. Vickers’ analysis 
reveals that the access charge should be higher or lower than marginal cost depends on whether 
the number of firms in the downstream competition is sensitive to the level of the access charge. 
In particular, his analysis suggests that when the number of firms is sensitive to the level of the 
access price, the optimal access charge should be above the marginal cost, and vertical 
integration yields higher welfare in this case. Conversely, if the number of firms in the 
downstream market is insensitive to the access charge, the optimal access price should be set 
below marginal cost, and vertical separation produces higher welfare results in this case. 
Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996) use a competitive fringe model to show that the 
ECPR can be a useful benchmark for determining optimal access charges. They analyze the 
precise meaning of ‘opportunity cost’ under differing demand and supply conditions. Throughout 
their analysis, they assume that the price for the downstream product is a choice variable for the 
regulator while competitors take this price as given. In the benchmark case, they show that the 
optimal access charge should be equal to the marginal cost of the bottleneck input when the 
incumbent’s break-even constraint is not binding at the social optimum. Conversely, if the break-
                                                 
38 Although both the first-best optimal access charge and the optimal access charge (when taxation of the 
competitive downstream products is feasible) can be set equal to marginal cost, the authors state that the two access 
charges have differing marginal costs since the firm’s effort is lower in the first best case. See Laffont and Tirole 
(1994, p. 1699). 
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even constraint is binding at the social optimum, the optimal access price should exceed 
marginal cost. Moreover, their results reveal that the latter benchmark case with price regulation 
implies an optimal charge fully consistent with the ECPR. Their model reveals that within a 
contestable market framework, a homogenous downstream product, a fixed coefficient 
production function, and no bypass possibility, the ECPR is equivalent to the simple margin 
rule.39 This implies that the simple margin should be set equal to the incumbent’s average 
incremental cost in the competitive activity. In addition, they show that the opportunity cost term 
in the ECPR formula is lower when product differentiation, bypass, and a variable proportions 
technology are allowed. 
Armstrong and Vickers (1998) extend the analysis of Armstrong et. al. (1996) to the case 
where there is a retail price deregulation. The authors analyze a model for a homogeneous 
product and price-taking rivals. They find that the optimal access charge can be above, below or 
equal to the marginal cost of the bottleneck input. In particular, when the demand and rival 
supply for the downstream product is linear, the authors show that the optimal access price 
should be set equal to marginal cost as long as the break-even constraint is not binding. 
However, based on the demand and the competitors’ supply functions, the optimal access charge 
can be above or below marginal cost. The authors also investigate margin regulation. When the 
regulator’s choice variable is margin between the retail price and the access price, they show that 
the optimal margin is fully consistent with the ECPR.  Importantly, their analysis reveals that 
welfare is higher with access price regulation than with margin regulation. 
Armstrong (2002) provides one of the most comprehensive studies to date in the access 
pricing literature. By making use of unit demand, competitive fringe, perfect retail competition, 
                                                 
39 The simple margin rule is simply the margin between the incumbent’s retail price and the access price. 
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and partial deregulation models, Armstrong examines topics such as the foreclosure problem, 
fixed retail prices, unregulated prices and bypass. In this study, he sheds light on topics such as 
access charges, dynamic issues and two-way access pricing in the telecommunications industry. 
Sappington and Unel (2005) examine privately negotiated input prices instead of access 
charges set by regulators. They observe that the number of successful input negotiations between 
ILECs and their competitors has been increasing in the telecommunications industry. The 
authors examine the privately negotiated input prices under asymmetries in the bargaining power 
of the incumbents and their competitors within a theoretical framework. Assuming a 
homogenous product and no retail price regulation, a vertically integrated incumbent that has an 
upstream cost advantage and one competitor with a downstream cost advantage, they find that 
privately-negotiated input prices result in the full extraction of consumer surplus in the retail 
market. Their analysis also suggests that under retail price regulation, multiple potential 
competitors and product differentiation precludes the full exploitation of consumers. This study 
casts doubt on the wisdom of the FCC's policy of encouraging private negotiations over input 
prices. 
 
2.3 Model 
The incumbent is a vertically integrated producer in this model and a monopolist in the 
production of the essential input. The essential input is assumed to be the sole input necessary for 
the production of the downstream product. The incumbent’s downstream affiliate and (n-1) 
competitors produce and market the retail product. The upstream and downstream production 
technologies are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. The incumbent’s marginal cost is 
. The incumbent sells the essential input to its rivals at unit price . The price of the essential c w
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input is determined by the regulator. The incumbent’s and a representative competitor’s 
downstream production are denoted by  and , respectively. For simplicity, we assume that a 
linear inverse demand function is given by 
1
Iq iq
( )2n iiP q q=∑1I + , where '( ) 0P ⋅ <  and .  ''( ) 0P ⋅ =
The incumbent and the (n-1) competitors are assumed to engage in Cournot competition 
in the downstream market. The profit functions of the incumbent and the representative 
competitor are given, respectively, by:  
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 ,                                                                                                           (2) 
where and are profits of the incumbent and the representative competitor. The first term in 
(1) is the upstream profit that the incumbent realizes from selling the essential input to the 
competitors. The second term is the incumbent’s profit from its downstream operations. The 
essential input cost is assumed to be identical for the incumbent’s upstream and downstream 
affiliates.
IΠ iΠ
40 
The regulator has full information regarding the demand, cost structure and the nature of 
competition. The following two-stage game is considered based on these assumptions. In the first 
stage, the regulator’s objective is to establish an optimal access charge. In the second stage, the 
incumbent and the (n-1) competitors take the input price as given and engage in quantity 
competition in the downstream market. Finally, consumers make their purchase decisions after 
observing the market price.  
 
 
40  The regulators impose parity requirements on vertically integrated producers in order to prevent sabotage. See 
Sappington and Weisman (2005, p. 156) footnote 3. 
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2.4 Main Findings 
Assuming an interior solution, the first order necessary conditions of the incumbent and 
the representative competitor for the profit maximization are the equality of marginal revenue 
and marginal cost:  and 1'
IP q P c+ = ' iP q P w+ = . Totally differentiating the first-order 
conditions and allowing for an infinitesimal change in the price of essential input yields: 
 
and ( )2n ii dq=+ =∑1 1' '( ).I IP dq P dq+ ⋅ 0 ( )1 2( ). nIi idq dq dw=+ =∑' 'P dq P+ ⋅ i . Solving the 
previous n equation system yields: 
 1
1
( 1) '
I ndq dw
n P
−= − + , and                                                                                                (3)                         
2
( 1) 'i
dq dw
n P
= + .                                                                                                            (4) 
The measure of total welfare employed here is the unweighted sum of consumer surplus 
and total industry profits, or, 1 2
nI
ii
W CS == +Π + Π∑ where consumer surplus (CS) is given by 
.  ( )1 12 2( )n nI Ii iU q q P q= =+ − ⋅ +∑ ∑( )i iq
Proposition 1 specifies the general principles regarding the optimal access charge under 
the stated assumptions.  
 
Proposition 1:  At the welfare optimizing essential input price, (i) the downstream 
product price equals the marginal cost of the essential input in the downstream market, and (ii) 
the optimal access charge is lower than the marginal cost of access. 
 
Proposition 1 (i) states that the welfare-optimizing access price in our simple Cournot 
framework enables market price to equal marginal cost for the critical input. In a sense this is the 
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first-best access charge. Therefore, allocative efficiency can be attained at the optimal access 
charge.  
  Two observations are instructive regarding the first-best optimal access charge. First, 
when price equals marginal cost, the incumbent’s downstream production is zero according to 
the necessary first-order condition for the incumbent.41 This result is consistent with Vickers 
(1995).42 Second, based on the first-order condition of the competitor, its downstream production 
is positive if and only if the optimal access charge is lower than the marginal cost of access.43 
Based on these observations and Proposition 1, it follows that the regulator uses the upstream 
markup to achieve the first-best output level in the retail market. In other words, by charging less 
than the marginal cost for the bottleneck input, the regulator is subsidizing access to harmonize 
the downstream product price with the marginal cost of production. The key point here is that the 
regulator compensates for downstream market power by reducing the critical input price below 
marginal cost to increase output in the retail market. 
Henceforth, for analytical convenience and clarity in comparisons of various regulatory 
policies, the market inverse demand function for the downstream product is assumed to be linear 
and of the general form: 
 
                                                 
41 One logical question concerns why the incumbent firm’s downstream production is zero at the first-best access 
charge. In other words, is the incumbent able to reduce its losses in the upstream market by producing positive 
output in the downstream market? To answer this question, note that the first-best access charge results in market 
price equal marginal cost (c) in the equilibrium. Therefore, if the incumbent firm produces some positive quantity 
for the downstream market at the optimal access charge, the market price for the downstream product should be 
lower. Hence, producing positive output actually increases the incumbent’s losses in this case. 
42 Vickers shows that in the case of linear demand when the vertically integrated producer is allowed into the 
downstream market, welfare is lower than the case where it is not allowed into the downstream market. Hence, 
Vickers’ result can be interpreted as the incumbent’s downstream production is zero at the optimal access price.  
43 This result is identical to Spencer and Brander (1983). They showed that in the case of first-best pricing of a 
publicly produced input with imperfect downstream competition, the input price should be lower than marginal cost 
of the input and downstream product price equals marginal cost. See Spencer and Brander (1983) Proposition 1. 
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Assumption 1:  ( )1 2( ) I nP Q Q q q qα β α β= − = − + + +L  
where 0α > and 0.β >   
 
To solve the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the two stage game, backward 
induction is employed. In this respect, we first solve for the equilibrium values in the second 
stage. The incumbent’s and a representative competitor’s profits under Assumption 1 are:  
1 1
1 1
( )
n n
I I
i
i i
w c q q q c qα β β
≠ ≠
⎛Π = − + − − −⎜⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ 1Ii
⎞⎟
iq⎟ 6)  
Lemma 1 summarizes industry profit and consumer surplus for the specified model. 
emma 1: When Assumption 1 holds and the downstream market is characterized by 
Courno
, and                                                            (5) 
1,
n
i i j
j j i
q q wα β β
= ≠
⎛ ⎞Π = − − −⎜⎝ ⎠∑ .                                                                                      (
 
L
t competition, the equilibrium incumbent’s profit, representative competitors’ profit and 
consumer surplus are given, respectively, by:  
( )2
1 2
( 1)
( )( 1) ;
( 1) ( 1)
n w
w c n
n nβ β
−Π = − − ++ +                                                        (7)       
2I ncc w αα − ++ −
( )2
2
2
( 1) 2
;
( 1)
n
i
i
n c w
n
α
β=
− + −Π = +∑  and                                                                                    (8) 
( )2
2
( 1)
2 ( 1)
n c n w
CS
n
α
β
− − −= ⋅+                                                                                                 (9) 
 
otal welfare (W) is assumed to be the unweighted summation of (7), (8) and (9).  The 
optimal access charge (w*) for the essential input can be found by maximizing total welfare (W) 
T
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with respect to the access price (w). Hence, the optimal access charge is given by 
* ( ) ( 1)w nc nα= − − .44 Note that *w  is the access charge that allows the market price for the 
downstream product to equal the marginal cost of the input. This is the first-best access pricing 
policy and * ( ) ( 1)nα− −  is lower than marginal cost of the input. Hence at the first-best 
access price the incumbent makes negative profit from the upstream market. In addition, as 
previously s ccess charge leads the incumbent’s downstream affiliate to not 
produce any output in the downstream market. Therefore, the vertically integrated producer 
makes negative profit at the essential input price *w  since the incumbent’s break-even constraint 
will bind at the social optimum. In the case where no lump-sum transfers are available to cover 
the incumbent’s losses, this access charge is not fe ible.  
Since the first-best access pricing policy is inconsistent with the financial viability of the 
incumbent provider, the regulator may opt to determine
w nc=
tated, the optimal a
as
 the optimal access charge under the 
break-e
“It has been assumed that the participation constraint for M 
(vertically integrated incumbent) applies to its profits overall, 
                                                
ven constraint. There are two possibilities regarding the break-even constraint from the 
regulator’s perspective. The first policy option is that the break-even constraint for the incumbent 
applies to the incumbent’s overall profits. The second policy option entails applying the break-
even constraint to the incumbent’s upstream activities only. Vickers (1995, p. 14) summarizes 
these two possibilities in the following statement in which he contemplates extensions of his 
analysis: 
 
44 Notice that the first-best access charge, * 1
nc
w n
α−= − , increases with the number of firms (n). Moreover, 
*
lim 1n
nc
w n
α
+→∞
−= =− c  implies that as the number of firms approaches to infinity, the first-best access charge approaches 
the marginal cost of the input. This result is not surprising since as n approaches to infinity, the firms become price 
takers and the results of the model become consistent with the perfect competition models. In other words, as n 
grows large, the regulator needs be concerned less with downstream market power, and hence w approaches to c. 
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including profits from the downstream competitive activity… 
Indeed, it is more in the spirit of deregulation to allow the firm 
independently to take it chances along with other competitors in 
deregulated activities, and not to prejudge the outcome of 
Howev ontemplates. 
Throughout th on-negativity 
constraint of th profit, to our knowledge there is no study that concentrates 
on a n
competition there... This suggests that a more realistic formulation 
might be to require that M at least break even in its upstream 
regulated activities.” 
 
er, Vickers does not actually conduct the formal analysis that he c
e vast optimal access pricing literature that focuses on the n
e incumbent’s overall 
on-negativity constraint applied exclusively to the incumbent’s upstream profit. One 
reason for this is that the models used in the previous studies include perfect downstream 
competition with price regulation. In these models, there is no business-stealing-effect unless 
there is product differentiation. When downstream competition is imperfect, implying that each 
firm in the downstream market has some degree of market power, a one-for-one displacement of 
outputs from the incumbent to the competitors typically does not hold in equilibrium. Therefore, 
the regulator solves the following problem:  
( )( )1 1max 1n I Ii u diG CS λ θ≠= + Π + + Π + Π∑                                                               (10)   1                       
where , [ ]0,1θ ∈ 0λ >  and  and 1uΠ I I1dΠ  denote upstream and downstream profits of the 
bent, respectively. The boundary points on this closed interval 
onstraints under examination. When 
vertically-integrated incum
characterize two possible break-even c 0θ = , the break-even 
constra nt’s upstream market. Conversely, when 1int applies to only incumbe θ = , the break-even 
constraint is implemented for the total (upstream and downstream) profits of the incumbent.  
Finding the optimal access charge for the incumbent’s profit constr requires solving 
the regulator’s constrained maximization problem in (10). In other words  optimal access 
aint 
, the
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price ca
 
n be found by setting the derivative of the Lagrange function equal to zero and solving it 
for the access charge (w).45 The optimal access charge is given by: 
   
( )( ) ( )( )
( )*
2 1 ( 1) 3 2 1 3 ( 1) 3n n nθ λ λ α θ λ λ+ + + − − + − + −
(n −1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)
n c
w
nθ λ λ= − + + + .                                 (11)   
The optimal access charge in (11) is the second-best access charge.  Notice that the 
optimal access charge exceeds the marginal cost of access.46  This implies that the second-best 
optima
. 
inding at 
the optimal access charge, the equilibrium value of the incumbent’s profit, the competitors’ 
profit a
 
l access price allows the incumbent’s downstream production to be positive. 
Lemma 2 summarizes industry profit and consumer surplus in the model at the optimal 
access charge when the incumbent’s profit constraint is binding at the social optimum
 
Lemma 2: When Assumption 1 holds and the incumbent’s profit constraint is b
nd the consumer surplus are given by:  
   
( )( )
( )
( )
2
1 2
2
2 (1 )
( )
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)
1 ( 3)( ) ;
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)
c
n n
n c
n n
λ θ λ αβ θ λ λ
λ α
β θ λ λ
− + −⎡ ⎤− − + + +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ −+ ⎢ ⎥− − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                    (12) 
                                                
2 (1 ) ( 1) 3 3 21I nn θ λ λ+ + + − +−Π =
 
45 The second-order conditions are assumed to hold, hence, the focus is on an interior solution. 
46The mark-up in producing the bottleneck input at the optimal access price for the incumbent is given by 
2 (1 ) ( 1) 3*
(( 1)(3 2 (1 )) 4 ( 1)
n
w c cn n
θ λ λ αθ λ λ
+ + + −− = −− − + + + ), where the denominator is unambiguously positive. Hence, the optimal access 
charge exceeds marginal cost if 2 (1 ) ( 1) 3 0nθ λ λ+ + + − > .  Since θ is a positive exogenous value determined by the 
regulator, there always exists a positive value of λ for different θ’s that satisfy this inequality. 
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( )
( )
2
2
2 (1 ) ( )
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)ii
c
n n
λ θ λ α
β θ λ λ=
⎤− + −Π = ⎢ ⎥− − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  ; and                                                   (13) 
3 21n n ⎡ +−
( )
( )
2
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) (3 1) ( )1
2 ( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)
n n
CS
n n
θ λ λ α
β θ λ λ
⎡ ⎤⎡ − − + + + −⎣= ⋅⎢ ⎥− − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
c⎤⎦                                                 (14) 
 
Equations (12) – (14) define total social w
Specifically, when 
elfare under the optimal access charge. 
1θ =
al access charge when the b
0
, equations (12) – (14) denote total welfare under the second-best 
optim reak even constraint applies
Conversely, when 
 to the incumbent’s overall profit. 
θ = , equations (12) – (14) define total social welfare under the second-best 
optimal access price when the break-even constraint for the incumbent applies to its upstream 
profit only. Proposition 2 provides a comparison of the two possibilities regarding the break-even 
constraint for the incumbent. 
 
Proposition 2: Assume that Assumption 1 holds and the downstream market is 
characterized by Cournot competition,  
 (i) The incumbent’s profit is higher when the break-even constraint for the incumbent 
applies to its overall profits )( 1θ = , 
(ii) The consumer surplus, the competitors’ profit and total welfare are higher when the 
break-even constraint for the incumbent applies to its upstream profit only )( 0θ = . 
 
The findings of Proposition 2 are intuitive regarding the incumbent’s break-even 
constraint. When the break-even constraint is introduced, the optimal access charge results in a 
welfare reduction relative to the first-best optimal access charge. In addition, the higher price-
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margin
ding i profits from 
downstream activities leads to a higher markup over the marginal cost compared to the case 
when t
to over
al cost markup for downstream output, the greater the welfare loss, ceteris paribus. 
Applying the break-even constraint to the incumbent’s overall profit inclu ts 
he break-even constraint for the incumbent applies to the upstream profit only. In other 
words, applying the break-even constraint to the incumbent’s overall profit leads to a higher 
deviation from the first-best optimal access charge than applying it to the incumbent’s upstream 
profit only. Therefore, applying the break-even constraint to the incumbent’s upstream profit 
only yields both a lower access charge and a market price closer to marginal cost, ceteris paribus. 
 Notice that the incumbent’s downstream production is positively related to the access 
price. The same observation is also true for the incumbent’s overall profit due to the fact that the 
second-best access price exceeds marginal cost of the bottleneck input. On the other hand, a 
competitor’s downstream production and profit are inversely related to the access price. Thus, as 
compared to the case where the non-negative profit constraint is restricted to upstream profit, the 
incumbent’s downstream output and profit increases when the non-negativity constraint applies 
all profit. For competitors, the converse is true. In addition, the competitors’ production 
falls by more than the increase in incumbent’s production. Therefore, higher access charges lead 
to a decrease in the market equilibrium quantity. Hence, consumer surplus will be lower in the 
case where the break-even constraint applies to the incumbent’s overall profit rather than its 
upstream profit only. This implies that social welfare is lower due to the fact that the overall 
decrease in the entrants’ profit and consumer surplus outweigh the increase in the incumbent’s 
profit.  
Hence, when the downstream market structure is oligopolistic rather than competitive, 
regulators must exercise caution in applying the break-even constraint on the operations of the 
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incumbent provider. To wit, applying a break-even constraint to overall profits rather than 
limiting it to upstream profits tends to result in higher market distortions and hence larger 
reductions in social welfare. 
 
2.5. Bypass 
o reasons why the fringe is able to bypass the 
incumb  service: (i) the fringe may supply the access service itself or purchase it from 
a third party; and (ii) the technology used by the fringe is a variable-coefficient technology and 
for high access charges the fringe may ately less of the bottleneck input. The 
compet
explanation for having the same marginal cost with the incumbent would be the marginal cost is 
                                                
It is common in the access pricing literature to consider the effect of the entrants’ ability 
to substitute away from the incumbent’s network. This concept is generally referred to as bypass. 
Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996) state tw
ent’s access
 use proportion
itive fringe model of Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers reveals that the possibility of bypass 
reduces the optimal access charge compared to the non-bypass scenerio by reducing the 
displacement ratio.47 Additionally, Armstrong (2002) suggests that when competitors have 
bypass opportunities, both the market price for the final product and the access charge are priced 
above marginal cost.48 
We assume that m of n-1 firms make their own input, and hence n-1-m firms buy the 
bottleneck input from the incumbent. Note that the number of firms that make the input is 
exogenous. Furthermore, for simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of producing the input 
is also c for the competitors who bypass the incumbent (i.e., make their own input). One possible 
 
47 See Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996, p. 142-143). 
48 See Armstrong (2002, pp. 323-324).  
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the result of cost minimizing production technology of the bottleneck input. Therefore, the profit 
function for the incumbent, one of m firms and one of n-m-1 firms are given as follows.  
1
Lemma 3 summarizes the components of total social welfare in the case of bypass.  In 
this respect, we obtain total industry profit and consumer surplus at the equilibrium when m of n-
1 competitors can bypass the incumbent’s network. 
 
Lemma 3: When Assumption 1 holds 
Cournot competition, the equilibrium incumbent’s profit, the competitors’ profit and consumer 
surplus are given, respectively, by:  
1 1i i⎜ ⎟
1 1
( )
n
I I I
n m i
w c q q q c qα β β
− − ≠
⎛ ⎞Π = − + − − −⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ,                                                             (15) 
1,
n
m
i i j i
j j i
q q c qα β β
= ≠
⎛ ⎞Π = − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ , and                                                                             (16) 
n
B
i i j iq q w qα β β⎛ ⎞Π = − − −⎜ ⎟∑ .                                                                                  (17) 
1,j j i= ≠⎝ ⎠
and the downstream market is characterized by 
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I m c m ww c n m
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+ + − +Π = − − − +
+ +
                                                               (18) 
( ) ( 1)1 n m c n m wα − − + − −
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2 ;( 1)im nβ +∑                                                                      (19) 
( ) ( 1)M n m c n m wm α − − + − −Π =
[ ]2
1
( 1) ( 2)1
i
n m
m c m wn m α
β− −
+ + − +− −
2 ;( 1)
B
n
Π = +∑  and                                                       (20) 
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( 1) ( 1)1
2 ( 1)
n m c n m w
CS
n
α
β
− + − − −= ⋅+                                                                         (21) 
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Summation of expressions (18) – (21) yields total social welfare. It is straightforward to 
show that the optimal access charge when the incumb
social optimum.49 Therefore, this optimal access charge would be the first-best optimal access 
price in this case, and once more the first best optimal access charge equates the market price to 
the marginal cost of the input, or c. However, the first-best optim
same qualitative results as in the non-bypass case. In other words, at the first-best optimal access 
charge, the downstream production of the incumbent–and the competitors that make the key 
input–is zero, since the optimal access charge is lower than the marginal cost of the access. 
Hence, the incumbent’s financial viability is threatened in the bypass case as well. 
ent’s budget constraint is not binding at the 
al access charge leads to the 
The regulator’s objective is therefore to determine the optimal access charge under the 
non-negativity profit constraint for the incumbent’s profit. We previously showed that applying 
the non-negativity constraint to the incumbent’s upstream profit only yields higher welfare in the 
non-bypass case. Therefore, we assume that the regulator’s objective is to determine the optimal 
access charge when the non-negativity profit constraint applies only to the incumbent’s upstream 
profit. In this case, the regulator’s problem is given by: 
( )n 1 11max 1I I                                                                      (22) i diG CS λ≠= + Π +Π + + Π∑ u
where 0λ >  and  and  denote upstream and downstream profits of the vertically-
integra
                                                
1u 1d
IΠ IΠ
ted incumbent, respectively. 
 
49 The first best optimal access charge is ( )* 1
n m c
w n m
α− −= − −  in the bypass case. First, notice that when the number of 
firms that make the input (m) is zero, w* is equal to the first-best access charge when bypass is not feasible. See page 
48. Second, ( )* 1
n m c
w n m
α− −= − −  decreases with the number of firms that can bypass. 
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The optimal access charge can be found by setting the derivative of the Lagrange 
function equal to zero and solving it for the access charge (w).  Therefore the optimal access 
charge is given by 
* ( ( 1) 1) (( ) ( 1)(3 2 ))m c
( 1) 2 ( 1)( 2)
n n m nw
m n n m
λ λ
λ
+ − + − + + += ⋅− − + + +
The expression 3) 
 marginal cost of the input.50 Hence, the incumbent and the 
compet
mmarizes equilibrium industry profit and consumer surplus in the model at 
the optimal access charge when the incumbent’s pr
optimum. 
 
Lemma 4: When Assumption 1 holds and the incumbent’s profit constraint is binding at 
the optimal access charge, the equilibrium values of the incumbent’s profit, the competitors’ 
profit and the consumer surplus are given, respectively, by:  
                                                          (23) 
 in (2 characterizes the second-best access charge. Notice that the 
second-best access price exceeds the
itors that provide their own input realize positive downstream production at the second-
best access price.  
Lemma 4 su
ofit constraint is binding at the social 
( )( )
[ ]
2
1 2 ( )( 1) 2 ( 1)( 2)
I c
n m n m
αβ λΠ = −− − + + +
2
( 1) 1 ( 2) 11
1 ( 3)( ) ;
( 1) 2 ( 1)( 2)
n mn m
n m c
n m n m
λ λ
λ α
β λ
+ − + +− −
⎡ ⎤+ + −+ ⎢ ⎥− − + + +⎣ ⎦
                                                  (24) 
                                                 
50 The mark-up for the bottleneck input at the optimal access price for the incumbent is ( ( 1) 1)( )* ( 1) 2 ( 1)( 2
n c
w c n m n m
λ α
λ
+ − −− = − − + + + ) , 
where the denominator is unambiguously positive. Hence, the optimal access charge exceeds marginal cost if 
1
1nλ > + .   
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Expressions (24) – (27) define total welfa
Proposition 3 provides selected comparative statics for changes in the second-best optimal access 
charge (w*) and welfare (W*) in the presence of bypass o
 
Proposition 3: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that downstream competition is 
characterized by Cournot competition. At the second-best optimal access charge: (i)
                                                 (27) 
re at the second-best optimal access charge. 
pportunities. 
 
*
0w
m
∂ <∂  
and (ii) 
*
0
m
∂ >∂ . 
 
W
irst, it is straightforward to show that the second-best optimal access charge is inversely 
related 
results in higher equilibrium market output. The rationale for this finding is that there are fewer 
uiring th input from the incumbent compared to the non-bypass case. Hence, there are 
more firms producing the downstream output at a marginal cost c which is lower than the 
second-best optimal access price. Therefore, the regulator can set a lower access charge 
F
to bypass opportunities. In other words, as the number of firms that makes their own 
input increases, the second-best optimal charge approaches the marginal cost of access. This 
firms req e 
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compar
ases with bypass. This is due to the effect of the lower markups 
discuss
2.6 Summary and Conclusion 
ple model yields some useful results concerning optimal access pricing in 
imperfectly competitive markets. A vertically-integrated industry is assumed to be deregulated 
and the formerly regulated firm is the only provider of the bottleneck input in the upstream 
market and one of n compet l market in which all firms 
possess
ed to the non-bypass case by lowering the mark-ups of all firms. Hence the effect of 
bypass is no different than the effect of an industry-wide cost reduction under the Cournot 
equilibrium.   
Since the equilibrium market output is higher with bypass, the consumer surplus is also 
unambiguously higher compared to the non-bypass case. The incumbent’s profit is 
unambiguously lower in the bypass case. This can be shown by taking the derivative of the 
expression given in equation (24) with respect to the number of firms that make the input (m). 
Unlike the consumer surplus and the incumbent’s profit, the manner in which bypass affects the 
competitors’ profit is ambiguous since it depends on the initial value of m. However, total 
welfare unambiguously incre
ed above. 
 
Although deregulation typically results in market structures that are closer to oligopoly, 
the access pricing literature has focused primarily on contestable/perfect competition models. 
This essay addresses that issue with a simple Cournot competition model with perfect 
information. This sim
ing firms in the downstream or retai
 some market power. 
When n firms engage in Cournot competition, the first best access charge equates the 
market price of the downstream product to its marginal cost. However, the first-best optimal 
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access charge is not feasible without governmental transfers since it threatens the financial 
viability of the vertically-integrated firm. On the other hand, the second-best optimal access 
charge exceeds the marginal cost of access. The regulator is assumed to have two policy options 
for determining the second-best optimal access charge: (1) The regulator could apply the non-
negativity constraint to the incumbent’s provider overall profit; or (2) The regulator could 
impose
are somewhat restrictive, developing more general models with less 
restrict
 the constraint only on the upstream profit of the incumbent provider. Our results suggest 
that the latter yields higher social welfare. The policy implication of this result is that regulators 
should be cautious in determining the access prices in imperfect markets when they are required 
to satisfy a profit constraint for the vertically integrated firm. Specifically, imposing the non-
negativity profit constraint on the overall profit of the incumbent may introduce distortions in the 
downstream product market and reduce economic welfare. We also examine the effect of 
outsourcing by allowing some of the firms to bypass the vertically-integrated firm’s network. 
With efficient bypass, our model reveals that optimal access charges decrease and welfare 
increases, ceteris paribus.  
The model developed in this paper uses a very simple framework and therefore 
suppresses some complicated real-world issues. For example, throughout the analysis the total 
number of competitors and the number of competitors that bypass the incumbent firm’s network 
are assumed to be exogenous. Additionally, we assume the regulator has perfect information 
regarding the cost and demand structures. We also disavow the possibility that the vertically-
integrated producer engages in sabotage or is subject to moral hazard problems. Given that the 
assumptions of our model 
ive assumptions would prove fruitful in terms of future research. 
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Appendix C - Proofs for Lemmas and Propositions 
total industry profits, 1 2 iiW CS == + Π + Π
Proof of Proposition 1:  Total welfare is the unweighted sum of consumer surplus and 
nI ∑ , where consumer surplus is given by 
( ) ( )1 12 2( )n nI Ii ii i elds 
                                                                                             (C1) 
U q q P q q= =+ − ⋅ +∑ ∑ . Totally differentiating total welfare yi
1
2
n
I
i
i
dW dCS d d
=
= + Π + Π∑
( )( )1 1'( ) ( 1) ( 1)I Ii idCS P dq n dq q n q= − ⋅ + − + −
( )( )1
2
( 1) ' ( 1) (
n
I
i i
i
d n P dq n dq q
=
Π = − ⋅ + − −∑
                                                               (C2)                 
i                             (C3) ( )1) ( )i in q dw P w dq− + −
( ) ( )( )1 1( 1) ( ) ' ( 1) ( )I Ii i id n q dw w c dq P dq n dq q P c dqΠ = − + − + ⋅ + − + −1 1I I                               (C4)  
Substituting (C2), (C3) and (C4) into (C1) by making use of (3) and (4) yields  
( )1 ( 1)( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) 'I i ndW P c dq n dq P c dwn P−= − + − = − +                                                     (C5)  
and therefore 
( 1)( )
( 1) '
dW nP c
dw n P
−= − =+ 0 .                                                                                            (C6) 
Equation (C5) characterizes the welfare optimizing access price in our simple Cournot 
model, one that equates the market price with the marginal cost of access. This completes the 
proof part (a). To prove part (b), note that the first-order conditions for the profit maximization 
condition of a representative competitor is ' iP q P w+ = .  The first-order condition with P c=  
implies that  if and only if roof of part (b). 0iq > w c< . This completes the p
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 y first-order conditions 
for profit maximization for the incumbent and each of the symmetric competitors is found by 
taking the derivative of (5) with respect to  and (6) with respect to . Therefore, the first-
order conditions are given by: 
; and                                                                                       (C7) 
.                                                                                          (C8) 
The first-order conditions for the profit maximization yields the equilibrium market 
output level:  
Proof of Lemma 1: Assuming an interior solution, the necessar
1
Iq iq
1
1
2 0
n
I
i
i
q q cα β β
≠
− − − =∑
1,
2 0
n
i j
j j i
q q wα β β
= ≠
− − − =∑
( 1)
( 1)
n c n wQ
n
α
β
− − −= ⋅+                                                                                                     (C9)       
uilibrium 
output levels for the incumbent and the entrant, respectively
Substituting (C9) into (C7) and (C8) and solving for 1
Iq and iq  yields the eq
. Hence, 
( 1)
( 1)
nc n w
n
α
β
− + −
+  ; and                                                                    (C10)  =1
Iq
2
( 1)i
c wq
n
α
β
+ −= + ⋅                                                                                                             (C11) 
Assumption 1 and (C9) yields the equilibrium market price of  
( 1)
1
c n w
n
P α + + −+
Expressions (C10), (C11) and (C12
equilibrium prof  the incumb n symmetric competitors, or 
= ⋅                                                                                                     (C12) 
) along with expressions (5) and (6) define the 
its of ent and the 
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( )2
1 2
( 1)2( )( 1)
( 1) ( 1)n nβ β+ +
( )
I nc n wc ww c n
αα − + −+ −Π = − − +  ; and                                           (C13)   
2
2
( 1) 2n
i
n c wα
=
− + −Π = ⋅∑                                                                                        (C14) 
Consumer surplus is de
2( 1)i nβ +
fined by . Therefore (C9) and (C12) are 
used to determine consumer surp
0
( ) ( )
Q
CS P x dx P Q Q= −∫
lus, or 
( )2
2
( 1)
2 ( 1)
n c n w
CS
n
α
β
− − −= ⋅+                                                                                             (C15) 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: Substituting (11) into (7) – (9) is sufficient to prove Lemma 2. 
However, it is useful to examine the effect of the optimal access charge on the other endogenous 
variables in the model. Substituting (11) into (C10) and (C11) gives the incumbent’s and one of 
the (n-1) competitors’ equilib
of the incum
rium production levels. Hence, equilibrium downstream production 
bent and a representative competitor are given by: 
( )
( )1 ( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)Iq n nβ θ λ λ= − − + + +  ; and                          
3 ( )1 n cλ α+ −                                    (C16) 
( )
( )
3 2 2 )1
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)i
c
q
n n
λ θ α
β θ λ λ
+ − −= ⋅− − + + +                                                                       (C17) 
Notice that the d
of the p (11). Equations (C16) and 
(C17) can be used to obtain the equilibrium level of downstream production; coupled with 
Assumption 1, this yields the equilibrium market price. Therefore, the equilibrium market 
quantit
(1 ) (λ+
ownstream production of the incumbent is positive. This is a direct result 
ositive mark-up on the optimal access charge given in equation 
y and price are given by  
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( )
( )
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) (3 1) ( )1
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)
n n
Q
n n
θ λ λ α
β θ λ λ
⎡ ⎤− − + + + −⎣= − − + + +  
c⎦ ; and                                               (C18) 
)
( )
(
( 3) ( 1) 3 2 (1 ) (3 1)
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)
n n n cθ λ λ
λ
+ + + ⎦
+ +                                                  (C19) P n n
λ α
θ λ
⎡ ⎤+ + − −⎣= ⋅− − +
welfare are obtained by using (C16) – (C19) in 
bent’s profit, competitors’ 
profit and consumer surplus at the optimal access charge are given, respectively, by:  
                    
The components of economic 
combination with the optimal access charge in (11). Hence the incum
( )( )
( )
( )
2
1 2
2 (1 ) ( 1) 3 3 2 2 (1 )1 ( )
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)
1 ( 3)( )
I nn c
n n
n c
θ λ λ λ θ λ αβ θ λ λ
λ α
+ + + − + − +−= −⎡ ⎤− − + + +
⎡ ⎤+ −
Π
2
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)n nβ θ λ λ
⎣ ⎦
+ ⎢ ⎥− − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 ;                               (C20) 
( )
( )
2
2
3 2 2 (1 ) ( )1
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)ii n nβ θ λ λ= Π = ⎢ ⎥− − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  ; and                                                 (C21) 
n cn λ θ λ α⎡ ⎤+ − + −−
( )
( )
2
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) (3 1) ( )1
2 ( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)nλ +
n n c
CS
n
θ λ λ α
β θ λ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− − + + + −⎣ ⎦= ⋅⎢ ⎥− − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                              (C22) 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  In order to prove part ( ent’s 
n (12) with respect to 
i), take the derivative of the incumb
profit i θ : 
( )
( )
2 2
1 2 (1 )( 1)( 3) ( ) 3 2 (1 ) 2 0
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)
I n n c
n n
λ λ α θ λ λ
β θ λ λ
+ − + − − + +∂Π = > ⋅⎡ ⎤− − + + +⎣ ⎦
                                          (C23) 
Hence, the incumbent’s profit increases with 
3θ∂
θ . This implies that incumbent’s profit is 
higher when the break-even constraint for the incumbent applies to its overall profits. This 
completes part (i). 
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Similarly, to show that part (ii) holds we take the derivative of the competitors’ total 
profit, given in equation (13), and of consumer surplus given in equation (14), with respect to θ . 
Therefore: 
( ) ( )
( )
28 (1 )( 1)( 3)( ) 3 2 (1 ) 2
n
i n n cλ λ α θ λ λ=∂ Π + − + − − + +
⎣ ⎦
∑
Hence, the competitors’ total profit decreases with 
2
3 0
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)
i
n nθ β θ λ λ= − < ⋅∂ ⎡ ⎤− − + + +                       (C24)  
θ , so the competitors’ total profit is 
higher when the break-even constraint for the incumb ly to its upstream profits. 
 
ent applies on
( )
( )
2
3
1)λ
+
⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦
2 (1 )( 1)( 3)( ) ( 1) 3 2 (1 ) (3 1)
0
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 (
n n c n nCS
n n
λ λ α θ λ λ
θ β θ λ
⎡ ⎤+ − + − − − + +∂ ⎣ ⎦= − < ⋅∂ − − + +
                    (C25) 
Similarly, consumer surplus is lower when the break-even co
applies to its overall profits since the consumer surplus is decreasing in 
nstraint for the incumbent 
θ .  
Summing (12) – (14) yields economic welfare. Taking the derivative of economic 
welfare with respect to θ  yields  
( )
2 2
3
2 (1 )( 1)( 3) ( ) 0.
( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)
W n n c
n
λ λ α
θ β θ λ λ
∂ + − + −= − <∂ ⎡ − − + + +⎣
2
n ⎤⎦
                                                      (C26)   
 total welfare is decreasing in θHence, . This implies that total welfare is higher when the break-
even constraint for the incumbent applies only to its upstream profit. This completes part (ii). 
 ing an interior solution, the first-order conditions for the 
profit maximization for the incumbent, each competitor that makes the essential input, and each 
of the symmetric competitors that buys the input from the incum
derivative of (15) – (17) with respect to their corresponding quantities. Therefore, the first-order 
conditions are given by: 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: Assum
bent are found by taking the 
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1 i
1
2 0
n
I
i
q q cα β β
≠
− − − =∑  ;                                                                                          (C27) 
2 Miqα β− −
1,
n
j
j j i
qβ
= ≠
−∑ 0c =  ; and                                                                               (C28) 
first-order necessary conditions for profit maximization yield the equilibrium market 
output level:  
1,
2 0i j
j j i
q q wα β β
= ≠
− − − = ⋅∑                                                                                        (C29) 
The 
n
B
( 1) ( 1)
( 1)
n m c n m wQ
n
α
β
− + − − −= ⋅+                                                                                  (C30)       
Substituting expression (C30) into (C27) – (C29) and solving for 1q , 
I M ,Biq  iq  and 
respectively, yields the equilibrium output levels for the incumbent, a representative entrant that 
makes the essential input, and a representative entrant that buys the input, respectively. Hence, 
1
( ) ( 1)I n m c n m wq
( 1)n
α
β +
− − + − −=  ;                                                                                   (C31)  
( ) ( 1)
( 1)
M
iq n
n m c n m wα
β= +  ; and                                                                         (C32) 
− − + − −
( 1) ( 2)B m c m
( 1)i
wq
n
α
β= ⋅+                                                                                        (C33) 
Assumption 1 and expression (C30) yields the market price:  
+ + − +
( 1) ( 1)m c n m wP
1n
α + + + − −= ⋅                                                                                    (C34) +
Expressions (C31) – (C33) and (C34) in combination with (15) – (17) define the 
equilibrium profits for the incumbent and its competitors, or 
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Consumer surplus can be defined as  
(C34) a
0
( ) ( )∫QCS P x dx P Q Q= − . Therefore (C30) and
re used to determine consumer surplus: 
[ ]2
2
( 1) ( 1)1
2 ( 1)
n m c n m w
CS
n
α
β
− + − − −= ⋅+                                                                      (C38) 
 
 4Proof of Lemma 4: Substituting (23) into (18) – (21) is sufficient to prove Lemma . 
Substituting (23) into (C30) yields: 
1 ( 1 (3 2 1))n m n m mn ( )
( 1) 2 ( 1)( 2)
Q c
n m n m
λ αβ λ= − ⋅− − + + +                                                            (C39) 
Similarly, substituting (23) into expressions (C31) – (C33) yields the downstream 
equilibrium production for the incumben
m-1 firms that buys the critical input from the incumbent. Therefore, 
− − + + + +
t, one of m firms that makes its own input, and one of n-
1
1 ( 3)( )c
( 1) 2 ( 1)( 2)
I n mq
n m n m
λ α
β λ
+ + −= − − + + +  ;                                                                         (C40) 
1 ( 3)( )
( 1) 2 ( 1)(
M
i
n m cq
n m n m
λ
2)
α
β λ
+ + −= − − + +  ; and                                                                 (C41) +
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1 ( ( 2) 1)( )
( 1) 2 ( 1)( 2)
B m cq
n m n mi
λ α+ + −= ⋅                                                                           (C42) β λ− − + + +
Assumption 1 and expression (C39), or equivalently substituting (23) into (C34) yields 
the market price, or:  
( 3) (( 1) ( 3 2 1)
( 1) 2 ( 1)( 2)
n m n m m n mn cP
n m n m
)λ α
λ
+ + + − − + + + += ⋅− − + + +                                               (C43) 
Expressions (C40) – (C42) and (C43
characterize the equilibrium profits for the incumbent and its competitors: 
) in combination with (15) – (17) and (23) 
( )( )
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efined as . Therefore (C39) and 
(C43) are used to determine consumer surplus, or 
 
0
( ) ( )
Q
CS P x dx P Q Q= −∫Consumer surplus can be d
[ ]
( )
2
( 1) (3 2 1) ( )1 n m n m mn cλ α⎡ ⎤− − + + + + −
m yields: 
2 ( 1) 3 2 (1 ) 4 ( 1)
CS
n nβ θ λ λ= ⋅⎢ ⎥− − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
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Proof of Proposition 3: Taking the derivative of (23) with respect to 
( ( 1) 1)(2 ( 1) 1) ( ) 0.c
( 1) 2 ( 1)( 2)
w n n
m n m n m
λ λ
λ
∂ + − + −= −∂ − − + + +
Therefore, the second-best optimal access charge is decreasing in m 
α − <                                                          (C48) 
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Summation of (24) – (27) gives th
charge. Taking the derivative of total welfare with respect to m yields: 
e total welfare at the second-best optimal access 
( )
2
23) ( ) 0cα+ >                                                  (C49) 32 ( 1)( 1)(( 1) 2 ( 1)( 2)
dW n n m n
dm n m n m
λ λ λ
β λ
+ + − += −− − + + +
Hence, total welfare increases with bypass, ceteris paribus. 
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CHAPTER 3 - The Political Economy of Unbundled Network 
Element Pricing 
3.1 Introduction 
The passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act was important on many different 
levels. One important policy objective of the Act was to create facilities-based entry for local 
telecommunications services. To achieve this policy objective, the Act implemented mandatory 
unbundling of network elements (UNEs). Thus, the incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC) 
was required to lease inputs to the competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) at a price set by 
the regulator. In a report released in 1999, the Federal Communications Commission defended 
their implementation of policy objectives by stating the following: “We find our decision to 
unbundle [certain local network elements] is consistent with the 1996 Act’s goals of rapid 
introduction of competition and the promotion of facilities-based entry.” By taking this position, 
the FCC clearly advocated the so-called stepping-stone hypothesis. This hypothesis contends that 
in order for CLECs to build their own facilities, they first need to gain access to the market by 
leasing UNEs. The stepping-stone hypothesis predicts that lower UNE prices will ultimately lead 
to more facilities based entry. In other words, the stepping-stone hypothesis conjectures that 
CLECs will transition naturally over time from reselling the services of the incumbent providers 
to investing in their own facilities-based networks. The implication being that lower UNE prices 
today will lead to higher rates of deployment of competitive facilities-based networks tomorrow. 
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Industry changes following the Act provided researchers with an opportunity to test 
ates 
policies (i.e. liberalized UNE prices) ty of the theory, empirical research 
has not always supported their position. Studies by Eisner and Lehman (2001), Crandall, 
Ingraham, and Singer (2004), and Hazlett (2006) found evidence refuting the stepping stone 
hypothesis. Willig et al. (2002) and H 002) contend that lower UNE prices 
tend to
whether or not the stepping-stone hypothesis holds. To date, even though the FCC advoc
 derived from the validi
asset and Kotlikoff (2
 increase competition and this increase in competition leads to higher levels of investment.  
Robinson and Weisman (2008) contend that the weight of the credible empirical evidence fails to 
support the stepping stone hypothesis. Crandall et al (2004) stated that areas for fruitful research 
remain if the researcher could access better data sources.  
This research will investigate two primary issues, both relating to UNE prices. First, as 
Crandall et al (2004) suggested, we empirically test the stepping-stone hypothesis using a state-
level data set that spans multiple years. To do this, we explore the effect of UNE prices on 
facilities-based entry. Second, in light of those findings, we investigate the determinants of the 
level of UNE prices. This inquiry will extend primarily the work of Lehman and Weisman 
(2000). They show that regulators set different UNE prices under price cap regimes than they do 
under rate-of-return regulation. Utilizing a new dataset, we seek to test whether regulators are 
influenced by the particular form of regulation in place. Additionally, we will empirically test 
whether elected regulators behave differently than appointed regulators. More broadly, our aim is 
to test whether regulators are active participants in the competitive games or merely serve as 
passive referees. Our results shed important light on the political economy of regulation in the 
U.S. Telecommunications industry. 
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The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents an empirical test 
of the stepping-stone hypothesis. Section 3.3 examines the political economy of regulatory 
behavior with respect to UNE prices. Section 3.4 concludes.  
 
3.2.1 A Literature Review of the Stepping-Stone Hypothesis 
According to Hausman and Sidak (2005), mandatory unbundling is defended by both 
regulators and entrants. These defenders argue that UNEs are a complement to facilities-based 
entry.  If UNEs and facilities-based entry are in fact comp
3.2 An Empirical Test of the Stepping-Stone Hypothesis 
lementary, then a decrease in the price 
of UNE
ation to free market rivalry.” 51   
                                                
s today will increase investment in facilities by CLECs tomorrow. In turn, the CLEC’s 
cross-price elasticity of investment with respect to access-based entry is negative. In anecdotal 
support of the stepping stone hypothesis, Hausman and Sidak (2005) cite MCI as an example of 
an access-based provider transitioning into a facilities-based provider. The overarching objective 
of the FCC in mandating unbundling was to stimulate facilities-based competition.  Dynamic 
efficiency, as explained by Robinson and Weisman (2008), can be expected to confer greater 
consumer benefits than a focus on static efficiency. Pindyck agrees with this long run view in 
arguing that  
“the  Telecom  Act  envisioned  a  world  of  independent  physical 
networks  competing  with  each  other  to  provide 
telecommunications  services  in  local markets. Unbundling was 
intended  to help  facilitate  entry  so  this goal  could be  reached. 
The intent was not to have permanent regulation, but rather to 
transition from regul
 
 
51 See Pindyck (2004, p. 2). 
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In  1999,  UNE‐P  lines  were  less  numerous  than  lines  owned  by  CLECs.52  When 
regulation  changed  in  1999,  CLECs  could  lease  UNE‐P  lines  at  more  favorable  rates. 
According to Hazlett (2006), this presented an ideal opportunity to test the stepping‐stone 
hypothesis.    The  hypothesis  predicts  that  a  decrease  in  UNE‐P  rates will  increase  CLEC‐
owned lines. Results by Hazlett (2006) unambiguously contradict this hypothesis. As UNE‐
P  lines  increased by 300%, CLEC‐owned  lines  experienced  a markedly  decreased  rate  of 
growth.    In  fa 8%  from  the 
years  2
ng stone hypothesis did not appear to hold. 
In perh s, Crandall et 
al. (2004) inve mand. Using 
data from 200 sing ordinary 
                       
ct,  the number of  non‐cable CLEC‐owned  lines decreased by 2
000  to  2003.    Most  notably,  the  correlation  between  UNE‐P  lines  and  non‐cable 
CLEC‐owned  lines  was  ‐0.997.  In  light  of  this  evidence,  Hazlett  (2006)  concludes  that 
“rather than provide a stepping stone to new entry, the UNE-P regulatory offering appears to 
crowd out new investment.”53 In their survey of five industrialized countries, Hausman and 
Sidak (2005) find little evidence in support of the stepping-stone hypothesis. In Canada, for 
example, even though the absolute number of lines owned by CLECs increased substantially 
from 1999-2002, CLECs became increasingly dependent on unbundled loops. In effect, the 
Canadian CLECs substituted away from resale and towards local unbundled loops. It is noted 
that Canada had a less expansive unbundling policy than did many other countries. However, 
evidence from the other four countries in the Hausman-Sidak study was equally unambiguous, 
and the steppi
aps the most frequently cited work on the stepping stone hypothesi
stigate the hypothesis in the U.S. by utilizing a model of factor de
0 and 2001, their dataset contained 56 state-level observations. U
                          
52 UNE-P is the platform that allows the CLECs to deliver a complete service without the need for their own 
facilities. Weisman and and Lehman write (2000, p. 344) that “UNE platforms enable a complete service to be 
provided solely through the use of UNEs.” 
. 53 See Hazlett (2005, p. 488)
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least squares, they find a strong positive relationship between the log of UNE average rates and 
the log of the ratio of facilities based lines to UNE lines. These results also appear to contradict 
the stepping stone hypothesis.     
3.2.2 Data and Econometric Models 
Our dataset includes the years 2002-2006. Data sources are as follows: Survey of 
Unbundled Network Element Prices by Billy Jack Gregg, NECA study results, USAC data from 
FCC filings, FCC local telephone competition reports, U.S. Census Bureau, State Retail Rate 
Regulation of Local Exchange Providers Reports, and the National Association of Regulatory 
Utility Commissioners (NARUC). The data are state-level and includes every state except for 
potentially influence CLEC-owned are as follows: (1) The UNE price per loop that is determined 
is a variable that measures the retail price distortion in local telephone markets. It is measured as 
Elect
regulators are elected and is equal to zero when regulators are appointed.  (4) Cost is the monthly 
Hawaii. “CLEC-owned” is the dependent variable for all regressions and is the number of 
facilities-based lines owned by CLECs in a state during a given year. Independent variables that 
by the state regulatory process; this is the primary independent variable of interest.  (2) BUSRES 
the ratio of the flat-rate local telephone price charged to business customers to the flat-rate price 
charged to residential customers. (3)  is a dummy variable that is equal to one when 
cost per local loop.  (5) Price cap is a dummy variable equal to one if the state is regulated under 
a price cap regim
the given year.  
In most regressions, year effects are taken into account.   Our econometric models use the 
ble in 
e and is equal to zero otherwise. (6) Population is the population of a state in 
log version for all non-dummy variables. Table 1 includes summary statistics for each varia
both log and non-log form.   
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The econometric models that are estimated are expressed as follows: 
Pooled OLS: 
it it ity Xα β μ′= + +                                                                                                (1) 
Between Effects: 
( )i i i iy Xα β α α ε′= + + − +                                                                                   (2) 
Random Effects: 
it it it ity Xα β ε′= + +                                                                                               (3) 
where i and t represent state and time, respectively, and ε  represents the error term.  
3.2.3 Results 
In terms of simple correlation, “UNE prices” and “CLEC-owned” have a negative 
relationship of -0.38 that is illustrated by Figure 1. Without a more sophisticated econometric 
approach, the stepping-stone hypothesis appears validated by the data. The negative correlation 
indicates that CLEC owned-lines are decreasing with UNE prices; however, a more sophisticated 
statistical approach is required. The first OLS regression appears in Table 2 and contains the 
identical set of independent variables as Crandall et al (2004). As shown in Table 2, the 
coefficient of log (UNE price) is negative in our regression and appears to confirm the stepping-
stone hypothesis. This contrasts sharply with the findings of Crandall et al’s (2004) study that 
estimate the same coefficient as being positive and statistically significant.   
 However, when theoretically important control variables are added (as shown in table 2) 
the log (UNE price) coefficient is not statistically different from zero. This result holds for the 
OLS, between effects, and random effects models, suggesting that the predictions of the 
stepping-stone hypothesis are not robust to alternative model specifications. Since the coefficient 
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of log acilities-based lines 
owned by the CLEC is not influenced by changes in UNE prices while the stepping-stone 
hypothesis predicts a statisticall  
hypothesis is not validated by these results, neither are the results of Crandall et al (2004). The 
results from these specifications imply  
Crandall et al (2004) suggests, nor are they complements as the stepping-stone hypothesis 
predicts.   
However, when the square of log (UNE price) is included to capture any non-linear 
relationship between UNE prices and CLEC-owned facilities, statistically significant coefficients 
emerge. This non-linearity implies one ra ces where the stepping-stone hypothesis 
holds a
 UNE prices are low 
retail m
(UNE prices) is not statistically different from zero, the number of f
y significant negative coefficient. While the stepping-stone
UNE and facilities-based entry are not substitutes as
nge of UNE pri
nd another range of UNE prices where the hypothesis does not hold. Table 3 shows that 
both log (UNE price) terms are statistically significant at the 1% level. For all regressions, the 
coefficient of the linear term of log (UNE price) is positive while the coefficient of the squared 
term is negative. Given the absolute size of each coefficient, estimates indicate that as UNE 
prices are lowered, the number of facilities-based CLEC lines only decrease when UNE prices 
are very low. For most levels of UNE prices found in our sample, there is a negative relationship 
between UNE prices and CLEC-owned facilities. That is to say, we find some support for the 
stepping-stone hypothesis.   
One possible explanation for the non-linear relationship is that when
arkups tend to be high.  This attracts facilities-based entry in the local telephone market.  
Conversely, higher UNE prices indicate lower retail markups caused by an increase in marginal 
costs for providing local telephone service. In this case, new firms are less willing to enter the 
market as facilities-based providers of local telephone service.  
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In other words, the statistically significant non-linear relationship between CLEC-owned 
lines and UNE prices imply that when UNE prices are at a low level, an increase in UNE prices 
will boost the percentage of CLEC-owned lines. However, at higher levels of UNE prices, any 
increase the UNE price level will actually decrease the percentage of CLEC-owned lines. The 
estimates of our coefficients serve to reveal the levels for which higher UNE prices will lead to 
fewer facilities-based lines, ceteris paribus. This critical value occurs where log (UNE price) is 
equal to 2.623 (based on estimates from the RE model found in table 3.3). According to these 
estimat
, a change in the UNE price in year t will affect the number of 
CLEC-
es, there is a positive relationship between UNE price and CLEC-owned lines when the 
UNE price is less than $13.78 as shown by Figure 2.54 When UNE prices are less than $13.78, 
the stepping-stone hypothesis is rejected.  Conversely, there is a negative relationship between 
UNE price and CLEC-owned lines when the UNE price is greater than $13.78. Given that over 
half of our sample has UNE prices exceeding this critical value of $13.78, there is some evidence 
in support of the stepping-stone hypothesis.  
Until now, researchers have not been able to test whether contemporaneous UNE price 
changes affect the facilities-based entry of CLECs in subsequent years.  Our dataset facilitates 
the opportunity to test whether or not changes in UNE prices influence entry over time. As 
shown in Table 4, the affect of current UNE price changes on CLEC-owned facilities does 
persist intertemporally. Thus
owned facilities in year t+1 in much the same fashion as in the contemporaneous case. 
This result holds true even when UNE prices are lagged for up to three years (the maximum 
number of years that our dataset allows).   
                                                 
54 This critical value for UNE price is $13.84 for between model and $13.54 for OLS.  
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 Our estimates suggest that UNE prices and facilities-based entry appear as complements 
to each other. These results are opposite those of Eisner and Lehman (2001), Hausman and Sidak 
(2005), Crandall et al. (2004), and Hazlett (2006). We conclude, based on our estimations, that 
increasing UNE prices can actually hinder facilities-based competition both within the same year 
and through time.    
The signs from the control variable coefficients are not sensitive to the inclusion of the 
non-linear log (UNE price) term and are discussed as follows. The ELECT coefficient is 
statistically significant at conventional levels in some regressions. The positive value suggests 
that there are more facilities-based CLEC lines in states where regulators are elected rather than 
appointed, ceteris paribus. This implies that conditions are relatively favorable for facilities-
based CLECs in states where regulators are subjected to the traditional electoral process. That is, 
entry is more attractive in states where regulators are elected, even controlling for relevant 
factors. This suggests elected regulators are more accommodating towards competitive entry via 
UNEs t
t ways to operate. This increased efficiency could 
conceivably reduce the profit opportunities for CLECs, thereby reducing incentives to build their 
own facilities-based lines. Our estimates for the price cap coefficient are both statistically and 
han are appointed regulators, ceteris paribus.   
Interestingly, the price cap coefficient shows a statistically significant relationship in 
most of the regressions. States with price cap regulation–in contrast to rate of return regulation–
have fewer facilities-based CLEC lines, ceteris paribus. Therefore, business conditions for 
CLECs appear less favorable in states with price cap regulation. One explanation for this result is 
that incumbent firms in states with price cap regulation are simply more efficient. As Lehman 
and Weisman (2000) note, price cap regulation (at least in theory) provides strong incentives for 
the incumbent to discover more efficien
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3.3 UNE Access, Price Cap Regulation, and the Regulator 
orms such as broadband.  Second, CLECs 
will ch
ically significant. The range of estimates for this coefficient is -0.241 to -0.784. This 
coefficients may be interpreted as follows: when other variables are held constant, the 
introduction of a price cap regime decreases the percentage of CLEC lines anywhere from 21.4% 
to 54.3%. 
 
3.3.1 A Review of the Effects of Liberalized UNE Access 
In a dynamic setting, according to Hausman and Sidak (2005), lowering the price of 
unbundled network elements is likely to decrease investment in multiple ways. First, new 
infrastructure development by the ILEC is likely to decrease since the returns from the new 
investment are diminished because CLECs may lease the input from the incumbent or invest in 
their own facilities.55 In support of this view, Waverman et al. (2007) found that lower UNE 
prices lead to less investment in alternative access platf
oose a UNE-based entry approach rather than build their own facilities since lower UNE 
prices increase the relative returns of UNE-based entry relative to facilities-based entry, ceteris 
paribus. Hausman and Sidak (2005) show that CLECs are increasingly dependent on UNEs over 
time.  In 1999, CLECs used UNEs for 23.9 percent of their lines. By 2003, that number increased 
to 58.5 percent as a result of liberalized access to UNEs.56  Waverman et al. (2007), and Hazlett 
and Havener (2003) state that proponents of lower UNE prices believe competition stemming 
from CLECs will be increased by these lower rates. This competition comes initially through 
                                                 
55 See also Pindyck (2007).  This is also discussed in Robinson and Weisman (2008). 
56 Our dataset reveals that the share of UNE lines fell to 43.6% by 2006. 
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UNE-based entry and later through building new facilities that compete directly with the 
incumbent’s existing networks. Conversely, opponents of low UNE rates argue that CLECs will 
substitute away from facilities based entry and toward UNEs. Regardless of the particular point 
of view, decreased UNE prices will unambiguously favor UNE-based entrants. For example, Ros 
and McDermott (2000) find that lower UNE prices lead to increased entry by CLECs.   
Using data provided by CLECs and collected by the FCC, Eisner and Lehman (2001), 
test how UNE prices affect competitive entry in several ways. They note that “the effect of 
regulatory policy ment, given the 
large n
t wa
achieve these higher profits is to take on risky investments that have high upside potential. If 
                                                
 on competitive entry is uniquely suited to the American environ
umber of state jurisdictions reaching independent determinations on wholesale and retail 
rates.”57 Although they find evidence that facilities-based entry is decreased with lower UNE-
prices, their empirical results for other types of entry do not match their prior expectations. For 
example, the number of CLECs is not influenced statistically by a change in UNE prices. An 
even more puzzling finding is that in some of their specifications, lower UNE prices appear to 
decrease UNE-based entry. 
3.3.2 The Political Economy of Price Cap Regulation 
Price cap regulation can potentially offer gains to all interest groups including the firm, 
regulator, and consumer. Incumbent firms might prefer price cap regulation for several reasons. 
The firm’s earnings are no longer limited as they were under rate-of-return regulation (ROR). 
Under ROR, the firm could only earn a normal profit tha s determined by the regulator. With 
price cap regulation in place, the regulator does not limit profit once the price cap has been set. 
The incumbent firm can now potentially secure higher profits than in the ROR case. One way to 
 
57 See Eisner and Lehman (2001, p. 5). 
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these risky investments turn out well, then the firm has a secure property right on these earnings. 
ROR presents the firm with limited incentives to take on high risk projects. The incumbent firm 
values the opportunity to increase economic profit in a manner that is independent of the 
regulator. Another reason why incumbents might value price cap regulation is that the firm now 
has increased pricing flexibility. For example, the incumbent can cut prices as the industry grows 
more c
ormal” level. Under a price cap regime, the firm has increased 
incentives to maximize efficiency relative to rate-of-return regulation. Because of this, the 
incumbent firm naturally prefers price cap regulation to ROR regulation, ceteris paribus. To 
secure a price cap regulatory regime, Lehman and Weisman (2000) note that firms agreed to pay 
up-front entry fees. These payments took the form of rate freezes, bill credits, refunds, and 
commitments to invest in new infrastructure and modernization.       
One drawback of price cap regulation, from the firm’s point of view, is that they are no 
longer shielded by outcomes in which they earn less than normal economic profit (perhaps due to 
increased competition). However, the perceived benefits of price cap regulation outweigh the 
                                                
ompetitive. The incumbent can now compete with new rivals in terms of price. When the 
regulator determines the price cap, the firm has flexibility in determining the price; however the 
firm cannot charge a price that exceeds the level of the price cap.    
A price cap regime, at least theoretically, provides the firm with increased incentives to 
reduce production costs to maximize profits. Ideally, with price cap regulation, the regulator will 
allow the firm to enjoy any increased profits that are the result of decreased costs.  Under a price 
cap regime, the opportunity for the firm to capture increased profits as a result of increases in 
efficiency is fundamentally different than that under traditional rate-of-return regulation where 
profits are limited to a “n
58
 
96) for a review of incentive regulation regimes, including price caps.  58 See also Sappington and Weisman (19
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perceived costs, as revealed when firms sought regime shifts away from ROR regulation and 
towards price cap regulation. From a societal standpoint, it is a beneficial that firms are exposed 
to downside risk, since incumbent firms now have strong incentives to become efficient. 
Increased efficiency will also clearly benefit consumers in the form of lower prices.   
The success of price cap regulation in practice relies heavily on the commitment of 
regulators to not adjust prices in response to the success of the regulated firm. For example, if a 
firm reports higher than expected earnings, the regulator could potentially appropriate these 
gains and transfer them back to consumers in the form of lower rates. As explained below by 
Braeuti
political pressure to change the price cap or price cap formula 
profits, consumers will no doubt petition the regulator to lower the 
 
According to Guthrie (2006), regulators are regularly pressured by firms, consumers, and 
other interested parties. Regulatory commitment is a much more complex problem when 
investigated in a dynamic sense.  If the regulated firm fears that its “excess” profits could be 
transferred back to consumers, then the incentive to innovate or build costly infrastructure is 
reduced. Price cap regulation in practice could produce the same results as ROR regulation did 
previously. Thus, firms must be assured of regulatory commitment in order for the efficiency 
gains predicted in theory to hold in reality. For price cap regulation to work effectively, the 
behavior of the regulator must be unaffected by the success/failure of the regulated firm.   
The passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act increased the complexity of the 
regulator’s control over competition since the Act mandated a new form of “regulator-assisted” 
gam and Panzar (1989, p. 389), this type of regulatory behavior is called regulatory 
opportunism: 
“A regulatory agency is likely to be subjected to considerable 
over time. If a firm regulated by price caps begins to earn large 
price in the core market.”  
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competitor entry. Regulators were given the responsibility of pricing UNEs leased by 
incumbents to market entrants. As UNE prices are lowered, entry into the market becomes 
easier. Thus, the Act provides regulators with an important tool to influence the dynamics of 
competitive entry. Since the Act applies to states regardless of regulatory regime, testing whether 
or not 
 the price of UNEs and increase competition. So even though the firm still has a 
property right ened due to 
increased com the regulator 
through UNE an (2000) note that the price cap commitment is an 
example of an incomplete contract. Since the regulator’s utility is decreasing with market prices, 
we can expect more liberal competition policies (through lower UNE prices) when the regulator 
does not share in the financial gains/losses of the incumbent firm. Under a price cap regime, the 
regulator typically is not committed to ensure a normal rate of return for the incumbent. 
Moreover, a regulator operating under price caps is not concerned with the profit level of the 
firm per se since the incumbent's earnings are allowed to fluctuate. However, under traditional 
ROR regulation, the regulator will often allow the incumbent provider to increase prices in the 
event of an earnings deficiency. Lehman and Weisman (2000) suggested that with rate freeze 
under price-cap regimes, regulators are fully insured against the adverse effects of competition. 
They stated that the absence of earning sharing under price caps leads to a moral hazard problem 
UNE pricing is systematically affected by the regulatory regime is an important policy 
issue. Testing this proposition relates directly to the issue of regulatory commitment discussed 
above.  
When a state switches from ROR to price cap regulation, the incentives that regulators 
face will change markedly. First, even if the regulator commits to the level of a price cap, s/he 
can still reduce
 to its future earnings, the value of these earnings could be less
petition in the industry. Because competition can be affected by 
prices, Lehman and Weism
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in which the regulator may induce excessive competitive entry. According to Lehman and 
Weisman, the reason for this moral hazard problem is the nature of the regulators’ utility 
function which is decreasing in market prices and increasing in competitive entry. Lehman and 
Weisman (2000, p.346) give the following example: 
“In a recent open meeting of the Texas Public Utility Commission, 
of competition in local telephone service markets in Texas; (ii) the 
the record indicates that the Commissioners noted (i) the absence 
inclusion of contribution and subsidies in wholesale prices of 
network inputs; and (iii) the fact that since Southwestern Bell 
“freely elected into” price cap regulation, it has no recourse 
contribution and subsidies embedded in these wholesale rates be 
price caps are in place,  the Commission can move unilaterally to 
encourage competition without any adverse consequences.”  
before the Commission in the event of under-earnings should the 
reduced or eliminated entirely. The implication being that because 
reduce subsidies and contribution levels in wholesale rates to 
 
Lehman and Weisman (2000) test the hypothesis that regulator behavior is affected by 
the particular form of the regulatory regime. Predicting that UNE prices would be lower under 
the price cap regime relative to rate of return regulation, their econometric results supported their 
hypothesis as they found a statistically significant negative relationship between price cap regime 
and the UNE price. Their UNE price data came from arbitration hearings that occurred after the 
1996 Telecommunications Act but before April 15, 1997. Using ordinary least squares, they 
concluded that price cap regulation led regulators to adopt lower UNE prices. Since their 
research had access to a limited number of arbitration hearings and had only 36 observations, 
they were restricted in the number of independent variables they could include. Also, their 
research only utilized ordinary least squares regression. As a result of these limitations, the 
negative coefficient on their price cap variable could be biased due to an omission of relevant 
variables. For example, if price caps are correlated with state effects that are unobserved, 
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estimates could be biased. A larger dataset and additional control variables could conceivably 
alleviate this issue. Since we have access to 215 observations, we are not limited econometrically 
by any issues with degrees of freedom. Additionally, since our dataset spans 5 years, we can test 
whether the relationship between the price cap regime and UNE prices holds through time. If our 
results subsequ es that theory 
suggests, then will increase 
substantially. 
The po as also been 
explored in th that political 
considerations e finds that 
emocrats that are elected (rather than appointed) set systematically higher prices. Also, 
Republ
3.3.3 Data and Empirical Analysis  
Our dependent variable for this analysis is the UNE loop price. In total, we have 245 
state-level observations from 2002 to 2006. Following Lehman and Weisman (2000), we wish to 
ently show a negative relationship between price caps and UNE pric
 the empirical evidence in support of the theoretical argument 
tential for differences in UNE pricing based purely on politics h
e literature. For example, Quast (2008) examines the possibility 
 affect UNE prices. Using data that ranges from 1996 to 2004, h
D
ican commissioners were found to set lower UNE prices relative to Democrats.  
According to Quast (2008), since Democrats tend to favor lower retail prices, they can 
potentially compensate for this lower retail prices policy position by granting incumbents higher 
prices for UNEs. Studies by Lehman and Weisman (2000), Beard and Ford (2004), and de 
Figueiredo and Edwards (2004) all found that UNE prices are higher in states with elected public 
utility commissioners.  Interestingly, de Figueiredo and Edwards (2004) also found that a one 
standard deviation increase in the percentage of contributions in an electoral cycle by entrants to 
the industry is associated with a decrease of approximately three-tenths of a standard deviation in 
the regulated local loop price (approximately $1.36 per month). 
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isolate the factors that influence the UNE loop price that is set by the state regulatory process. 
Departing from their research, we utilize regulator determined UNE prices instead of prices set 
by the arbitration process.  These UNE prices reflect an agreement between the ILEC and CLEC 
that do not challenge the regulator’s decision. In other words, if the incumbent and entrant both 
agree on the UNE price set by the regulator, then an agreement is met in the first stage. If one 
party challenges the regulator’s decision through the regulatory process, then agreement is not 
met until the second stage. Our dataset includes only first-stage agreements while Weisman and 
Lehma
 the interLATA long distance 
market once certain market-opening requirements are met. Interlata is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the state’s incumbent carrier completes the filing that allows for long distance 
service. It is 0 before the completion of the filing date, and 1 after it. (7) SBC 2005 merger. SBC 
n (2000) focus solely on second stage agreements. Both approaches are expected to reveal 
similar results; however, our approach increases the size of our dataset without sacrificing 
relevant information. Our independent variables were chosen on the basis of theoretical 
importance. The independent variables that potentially influence UNE prices include the 
following: (1) Political represents the share of the state house and senate that have Republican 
Party affiliation. We assume that the house and senate both have equal influence.  (2) Loops per 
square mile is the total number of loops in a state divided by the geographical area of the state. 
(3) CLEC market share is the share of the market currently served by competitive local exchange 
carriers. (4) Elect is a variable that is equal to one if state regulators are elected and equal to zero 
if state regulators are appointed. (5) Total lines is a variable that equals the total number of lines 
in a state. This is the sum of wireless, wireline and cable lines in a state. (6) Interlata is a 
variable that relates to Section 271 of the 1996 Telecommunication Act. The Act allows for 
Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) to compete in
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merger is the only merger that we control since this merger is the only incumbent related merger 
that took place in the time span of our dataset. This variable is equal to one in after 2004 in states 
where SBC was the largest incumbent.  For states where SBC was not the largest incumbent or 
before 2005 this dummy variable is set equal to zero. (8) Deregulation is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one for the states where there is no regulation. (9) Price Cap is a dummy 
variable which is equal to one if the state is regulated under a price cap regime, otherwise it is 
equal to zero. (10) When both the deregulation and price cap variables are equal to zero, the 
state is operating under a ROR regulatory regime.   
Ai and Sappington (2002) and Ai, Martinez, and Sappington (2004) note that in the 
telecommunications industry, controlling for all relevant factors requires the complete use of a 
panel data set. Following Ai and Sappington (2002) and Ai, Martinez, and Sappington (2004), 
we employ an approach that introduces dummy variables of two distinct types. This approach is 
designed to decrease the systematic variation in our econometric specifications. In the random 
effects model, we use state-specific dummy variables that are designed to control for differences 
that are not directly observed by the researcher but still influence UNE prices. For example, 
state-specific laws may influence UNE prices. We are not able to employ a fixed effects 
approach because the price cap variable is time-invariant for many states.  
3.3.4 Results- Political Economy of Price Cap Regulation 
The primary independent variable of interest is Price Cap. It is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one when a state utilizes price cap regulation and is equal to zero when rate of return 
regulation is utilized. As noted in Lehman and Weisman (2000), the price cap variable could be 
endogenous. We tested for endogeneity for the price cap variable by performing a Hausman test 
and endogeneity was rejected. We also ran the same test for total lines and CLEC market share 
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and endogeneity was also rejected for these variables. As shown in Table 6, we ran a 
specification using four distinct econometric models and we were able to control for various 
relevant factors.59 As economic theory predicts, the coefficient on the price cap variable is 
negative for each econometric model; additionally, the price cap variable was negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for three out of the four models. Thus, our econometric 
results provide evidence that regulators behave differently when operating under price cap 
regulation than they do under other alternative forms of regulation. Estimated coefficients for the 
price cap variable range from -1.530 using an instrumental variable approach to -1.979 when 
betwee
ut setting UNE prices 
too low since a normal profit for the incumbent is no longer guaranteed. The concerns about the 
incumbent’s return are alleviated with price cap regulation, and the regulator responds by setting 
lower UNE prices. As the following analysis indicates, regulators also respond to other 
incentives.  
n effects estimation is performed. In terms of dollars, the between effects estimate 
suggests that the introduction of a price cap regime leads to $1.98 decrease in the UNE price, 
ceteris paribus. Since the mean UNE price is $15.37 in our sample, the price cap coefficient in 
each model is economically significant.   
These estimates strongly suggest the presence of regulatory moral hazard. If the 
incumbent experiences an earnings deficiency under ROR regulation, then the regulator will 
typically be required to raise retail prices in the future. To guard against this event, the regulator 
will keep UNE rates sufficiently high to ensure a normal rate of return for the incumbent. 
Conversely, under price cap regulation, the regulator is less concerned abo
                                                 
59 Specification 2 in Table 6 uses an instrumental variable for total lines.  The instrument was the population served 
by the non-UNE lines provided by the CLEC.   
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As CLEC market share increases, UNE prices decrease. This result is large and 
statistically significant in each model. We considered the possibility that the variable CLEC 
share could be endogenous with UNE prices. However, when we ran instrumental variables 
estimation, endogeneity was rejected.  The reason behind the inverse relationship between CLEC 
share and UNE prices can be explained through a political economy framework. As the share of 
the market possessed by CLECs increase, ceteris paribus, the relative strength between the ILEC 
and CLEC is altered in favor of the latter. This will tend to increase the bargaining power that the 
CLEC possesses. Additionally, a relatively stronger CLEC will be able to exert more lobbying 
pressure on the regulator. These effects will tend to decrease the UNE price as the CLEC’s 
market share increases.   
One way to test the sensitivity of the regulator to the market share of the CLEC is to 
include an interaction term in our regression analysis. When ELECT is included in the regression 
(both a
us. In other words, CLECs have more to gain from lower UNE prices as their 
market share increases and they secure these gains in part through capturing the elected 
regulator. Using our estimates, we can investigate the size of the impact that CLEC share has on 
s a dummy variable and as an interaction term with CLEC share), the results suggest that 
UNE prices are dependent on the appointment process and on CLEC market share. Since the 
interaction variable of ELECT and CLEC market share is statistically significant and negative, 
we conclude that UNE prices are more sensitive to CLEC share when the regulator is elected 
(instead of appointed). This is consistent with public choice theory in that elected (relative to 
appointed) regulators are more easily captured by the firms they regulate since elected regulators 
depend on campaign contributions to retain their elected position. Hence, as CLECs increase 
their market share, elected regulators set lower UNE prices than do their appointed counterparts, 
ceteris parib
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UNE p
 the UNE price when the method of selecting the regulator is changed. 
When t
rices while setting the ELECT variable equal to one. The mean value of CLEC share is 
0.159 with a standard deviation of 0.064. Based on the pooled OLS estimation results and 
assuming the regulator is elected, a one standard deviation increase in CLEC share from the 
mean will decrease the UNE price by $1.88. In contrast, when the regulator is appointed and the 
ELECT variable is equal to zero, the same increase in CLEC market share decreases UNE price 
by only $0.58. Hence, consistent with economic theory, an increase in CLEC share will have 
more of an impact when the regulator is elected– a $1.88 decrease in price– than when the 
regulator is appointed –a $0.58 decrease in price.   
Alternatively, we can treat the CLEC share as constant at the mean and use our estimates 
to calculate the change in
he regulator selection a process changes from one in which s/he is appointed to a process 
where s/he is elected, UNE prices are estimated to increase by $0.55.60  Hence, when the CLEC 
share is constant at its mean (0.159), moving from an appointment process to an electoral process 
will tend to favor the incumbent. This makes intuitive sense because at this mean level of CLEC 
market share, the ILEC is still relatively more powerful and can be expected to exert relatively 
more control in the form rent-seeking behavior than the CLEC. As our estimates suggest, the 
elected official is more likely to be captured by the ILEC than by the CLEC at the mean of 
CLEC share.   
A number of other observations follow directly from our findings. First, the political 
coefficient is negative in all of the models, however it is statistically insignificant. Abel (2002) 
contends that Republican politicians are relatively more supportive of free-market tendencies 
than their Democratic counterparts. This leads him to hypothesize that regimes with Republican 
                                                 
60 Calculation is based on the mean of CLEC share. 
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tendencies will tend to support increases in both CLEC entry and the size of fringe competition 
in local telephone markets. The estimates from Abel (2002) support both of these hypotheses, 
albeit weakly. Our results are similar in spirit to those of Abel (2002) as we find that as states 
become more Republican, other things equal, UNE rates tend to fall (although close, these 
estimates are not statistically significant). This seems to suggest that a pro-Republican legislature 
leads to a decrease in rates that favor competitors at the expense of incumbents. Another reason 
for this effect could be that lobbying efforts by CLECs could have more effect when the 
legislature is dominated by Republicans.   
Second, loops per square mile are negatively related with UNE prices. This result is 
statistically significant for each model. One explanation is that as loops per mile increase, 
additional political pressure is exerted on regulators to decrease the price. Alternatively, urban 
environments are able to achieve economies of scale and density that allow the regulator to lower 
UNE prices while sparsely located loops in rural states are associated with higher prices. 
Third, the coefficient for total lines (wireless lines plus wireline) is negative and 
significant while the coefficient for total lines squared is positive and significant. With this non-
linear relationship between total lines and the UNE price, the relationship between these two 
variables depends on the number of total lines.  The mean number for total lines in our sample is 
7.43 million. When total lines exceed 39.25 million in a state, there is a positive relationship 
betwee
                                                
n total lines and UNE price (based on the estimates from the RE model found in table 
3.6).61 When total lines are less than 39.25 million, there is a negative relationship between total 
lines and UNE price. For the most relevant values, our estimates suggest that an increase in total 
lines will lead to an increase in the UNE price, ceteris paribus.  
 
OLS, 29.75 million for IV and 26.5 million for between model. 61 This critical value for total lines is 29.9 million for 
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Fourth, Interlata is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the state’s incumbent carrier 
completes the filing that allows it to provide InterLATA long distance service. It is 0 before the 
completion of the filing date. The coefficient for this variable is positive and statistically 
significant in three of the models. With the introduction of InterLATA, incumbents not only 
received access to the InterLATA long distance market, but they also received higher UNE 
prices. One possible explanation for this result is that ILCECs were willing to “bribe” regulators 
in the form of lower UNE prices in order to secure access to the lucrative InterLATA long 
distance markets. 
Fifth, the SBC 2005 variable is equal to one after 2004 in states where SBC was the 
largest incumbent. The coefficient estimates for this variable are mixed.  In two of the models the 
coefficient is negative and significant, in one model the coefficient is positive and significant, 
and in one model the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Therefore, the effect of SBC Merger 
gives different results for different specification 
 
The passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act provided regulators with additional 
instruments through which to control outcomes, including the intensity of competition, in local 
telephone industry. The FCC envisioned that lower regulated UNE prices would increase 
facilities based entry by CLECs.  However, most research found that lower UNE prices actually 
led to less facilities-based entry. Using a panel data set, we find evidence in support of the 
stepping stone theory that appears to contradict much existing research
3.4 Conclusion 
. Over the set of most 
relevant UNE prices, our estimates suggest that facilities-based entry increases as a result of 
 set, we find our results hold intertemporally lower UNE prices. Utilizing our unique panel data
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and als
      
e increases.  Since the incentive to engage in rent-seeking behavior increases 
with m
e. Future changes in telecommunication policy 
should consider the fact that regulatory behavior is likely to be endogenous rather than 
exogenous to changes in policy variables of interest. 
 
o when UNE prices are lagged by one year. Our estimates provide evidence that the FCC 
may have been correct with the stepping-stone hypothesis.    
After investigating how UNE prices affect facilities-based entry, we analyze how the 
regulator determines UNE prices in general. Our estimates reveal two primary conclusions.  
1) Regulators are subject to regulatory moral hazard. That is to say, they set lower UNE prices 
under a price cap regime because they are shielded from the adverse consequences of raising 
local rates.  2) Elected (relative to appointed) regulators grant increasingly lower UNE prices as 
CLEC market shar
arket share, our results suggest that elected regulators are more easily influenced by 
lobbying when CLEC market share increases.   
Our results reveal that regulators are not passive actors in the telecommunications 
industry in which they regulate. Rather than being referees of the game, their behavior provides 
evidence that they are in fact “players” in the gam
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Figure 3.1  Correlation between ln(CLEC-Owned) and ln(UNE price) 
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Figure 3.2  Relationship between CLEC-Owned Lines and UNE Prices 
 
1,074.635 
 
    
 
 
 
    
     95.995 his range 
      22.375
                        7.01                           13.78 15.37                                           25.57       UNE Price 
                         (Min)                                    (Mean)                                        (Max) 
CLEC-Owned Lines (Thousands) 
                                                    Stepping Stone Hypothesis holds in t
                                                                
 94
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for the Stepping-Stone Hypothesis (2002-2006) 
rvations Mean Std.Dev Min Max Variable Obse
CLEC Owned 218 184,444.7 219,923.1 1944.1 1,284,951 
UNE Price 245 15.372 3.633 7.01 25.565 
Loop Cost/Mo 243 21.94396 5.305445 13.324 35.263 
BUSRES 245 1.778 0.476 0.596 2.828 
Population 245 5,946,944 6,482,289 497,204 36,200,000 
log (CLEC Owned) 218 11.489 1.235 7.573 14.066 
log (UNE price) 245 2.705 0.236 1.947 3.241 
Log (UNE) squared 245 7.373 1.273 3.792 10.506 
Log(Loop Cost/Mo) 239 3.084 0.205 2.575 3.563 
log (BUSRES) 245 0.534 0.306 -0.517 1.039 
lo 17.406 g (population) 245 15.11 1.014 13.112 
Elect 240 0.250 0.434 0 1 
Price Cap 245 0.735 0.433 0 1 
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Table 3.2 Testing the Stepping-Stone Hypothesis  
                             Dependent variable: the log of CLEC-Owned lines. 
ariable OLS 
(i) (ii) 
 
Effect Effect 
V OLS Between Random  
ln (UNE price .202***
(0.388) 
6 
(0.590) 
 
(0.751) 
 
(0.353) 
) -2 -0.28 -0.522 0.115
ln (cost) -0.641 
(0.435) 
 
(0.495) (0.754) (0.406) 
-0.429 -0.378 -0.515 
ELECT ------- 42 
(0.260) 
 
(0.259) (0.268) 
0.3 0.417 0.324 
ln (BUSRES -------  
(0.299) (0.374) (0.235) 
) -0.206 -0.316 0.127 
ln (population ------- ***
(0.144) 
**
(0.132) (0.126) 
) 1.041 1.057* 1.114 
Price Cap ------- 06 
(0.239) 
* 
(0.301) (0.139) 
-0.3 -0.517 -0.164 
Constant 19.384 
(1.177) 
26 
(3.829) 
 
(3.502) 
-4.338** 
(2.779) 
-1.8 -1.708
Observations 213 3  21 213 213 
R-squared 0.224 0.631 0.733 0.590 
         tistically sig t at 1% leve
                                    **   Statistically significant at 5% level 
            tically sig at 1% leve
          
        
 
 
                  *** Sta nifican l 
                        *     Statis
                        
nificant l 
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Table 3.3 Testing the Stepping-Stone Hypothesis by Including Non-linearity in UNE Prices. 
le OL B
 E
                          Dependent variable: the log of CLEC-Owned lines. 
Variab S etween 
ffect 
Random  
Effect 
ln (UNE price) 18.86
(4.2
23.
(8
15.722*** 5*** 
86) 
229*** 
.095) (3.656) 
ln ( ) squa .62
(0.8
-4.4
(1
-2.997*** UNE price red -3 0*** 
42) 
20*** 
.501) (0.699) 
ln (cost) -0.3
(0.4
-0
(0
96 
48) 
.324 
.692) 
-0.494 
(0.385) 
ELECT 0.3
(0.2
0
(0
59 
41) 
.415* 
.238) 
0.380 
(0.244) 
ln (BUSRES) -0
(0.2 (0
.330 
64) 
-0.528 
.370) 
-0.042 
(0.225) 
ln (population) 1.0
(0.1
1.
(0
1.040*** 05 
35) 
066*** 
.121) (0.116) 
Price Cap 0.49
(0.1
-0.7
(0
- 6** 
90) 
84*** 
.291) 
-0.290** 
(0.136) 
Constant 26.328
(4.7
-33.357***
(11
-23.236 
(5.148) 
- ***
66) .218) 
Observations 213 213 213 
R-squared 0.680 0.780 0.643 
                         *** Statistically significant at 1% level 
                                  **   Statistically significant at 5% level 
                        *     Statistically significant at 1% level           
 97
Table 3.4  Testing the Stepping-Stone Hypothesis by Lagging UNE Prices. 
Dependent variable: the log of CLEC-Owned lines. 
  S en
ct 
m 
ect 
Variable OL Betwe   Rando
Effe  Eff
lagged log (UNE price) *
1) 
* ** 
37) 
17.766* * 21.132*
(4.54
* 17.353*
 (3.7
lagg ed **
2) 
*
4) 
** 
10) 
ed log (UNE price squar ) -3.411*  -4.062*
(0.90
* -3.369*
(1.34 (0.7
ln (cost) -0.585 
8) 
76 
0) 
9** 
81) (0.44
-0.3
(0.69
-0.81
(0.3
ELECT 0.490** 
1) 
** 
7) 
4** 
38) (0.23
0.514
(0.23
0.53
(0.2
ln (BUSRES) -0.319 
9) 
16 
7) 
36 
30) (0.26
-0.5
(0.36
0.0
(0.2
ln (population) 1.033***
1) 
**
0) 
** 
15) 
 1.069*
(0.14
 0.981*
(0.12 (0.1
Price Cap -0.443**
3) 
*
4) 
1* 
36) 
 -0.762*
(0.19
 -0.24
(0.29 (0.1
Constant -24.844**
6) 
**
7) 
5*** 
23) 
* -30.188*
(4.72 (9.81
-23.04
(5.3
Observations 176 76 1 176 
R-squared 0.711 88 86 0.7 0.6
                  *** Statistically significant at 1% level 
                         **   Statistically significant at 5% level 
                         *     Statistically significant at 1% level 
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Table 3.5  Summary Statistics for the Political Economy of UNE Prices (2002-2006) 
V viation Min Max ariable Observations Mean Std. De
UN 15.372 3.633 7.010 25.565 E Price 245 
Loop cos 2 35.263 t/mo 243 1.943 5.305 13.324 
Loop 10 1s/sq. mi. 245 2.978 41.310 3.184 794.245 
Political 40 0.5 0 0.893 2 08 .145 0.136 
CLEC share 0. 0 0.445 223 159 .064 0.030 
Elect  0.2 0 1 240 50 .434 0 
Elect*CLEC sha 0 .315 re 223 .039 .076 0 
Total Lines 4 7 50.783 23 .43 8.28 .436 
Total Lines Squared 34 1 578.89  2 23.43 330.82 .191 2
Interlata 240 0.83 0.3 1 8 70 0 
SBC 2005 245 0.106 0.309 0 1 
Deregulation 245 .116 0.313 0 1 
Price Cap 245 0.735 0.433 0 1 
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Table 3.6  Political Economy of UNE Prices. 
 Dependent varia s. 
iable OLS V een 
Effect 
m
Effect 
ble:  UNE price
Var I Betw Rando  
Loop Cost/Mo 152***
(0.038) 
3*** 
(0.039) 
1* 
(0.078) 
* 
(0.033) 
0.  0.15 0.14 0.055
Loops per sq mi. .005**
(0.001) 
6***
(0.001) 
** 
(0.003) 
**
(0.002) 
-0 * -0.00  -0.007 -0.007*  
Political -1.247 
(1.306) 
.931 
(1.401) 
43 
(2.352) 
2 
(1.840) 
-1 -1.6 -1.96
CLEC Share .022***
(3.317) 
92*** 
(3.714) 
027 
(6.642) 
** 
(3.049) 
-9  -9.8 -10. -6.924
ELECT 3.874*** 
(0.979) 
85*** 
(1.267) 
2* 
(2.136) 
2.751*** 
(1.048) 
3.6 4.15
ELECT*CLEC share .344***
(5.829) 
288***
(6.107) 
965* 
(12.648) 
-9.686** 
(4.865) 
 -20 -19. -22.
Total Lines .299*** 
(0.054) 
238*** 
(0.089) 
12** 
(0.104) 
***
(0.083) 
-0 -0. -0.2 -0.314  
Total Lines squared 005***
(0.001) 
04* 
(0.002) 
4 
(0.003) 
**
(0.002) 
 0.  0.0 0.00 0.004  
Interlata .151* 
(0.638) 
253* 
(0.650) 
7* 
(2.272) 
179 
(0.307) 
1 1. 3.88 -0.
SBC 2005 -0.486 
(0.562) 
.533 
(0.568) 
71* 
(1.701) 
1.822*** 
(0.335) 
-0 -3.2
Deregulation 0.723 
(0.806) (0.851) 
68 
(1.789) 
63 
(0.664) 
0.877 2.4 0.2
Price Cap .577***
(0.491) 
30*** 
(0.498) 
79* 
(0.999) 
143 
(0.487) 
-1  -1.5 -1.9 -0.
Constant 16.555*** 
(1.463) 
16.629***
(1.471) 
14.505***
(3.043) 
18.472*** 
(1.449) 
Observations 214 208 214 214 
R-squared 0.60 0.60 0.79 0.48 
                       *** Statistically significant at 1% level 
                       **   Statistically significant at 5% level 
       *     Statistically Significant at 1% level 
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